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Indeed, land-use planning commentators have suggested that the threat of 
financial liability for unconstitutional police power regulations would help 
to produce a more rational basis for decisionmaking . . . Such liability 
might also encourage municipalities to err on the constitutional side of 
police power regulations, and to develop internal rules and operating 
procedures to minimize overzealous regulatory attempts. . . .  After all, if 
a policeman must know the constitution, then why not a planner?2 
Justice Brennan’s above-quoted warning was issued over twenty years ago in his 
dissent in the U.S. Supreme Court case of San Diego Gas and Electric Company v. 
City of San Diego.  With its foreshadowing of monetary liability for “negligent 
planning,” the San Diego case generated uncertainty and anxiety in the planning 
profession.  These concerns lessened over time as a series of subsequent U.S. 
Supreme Court land use decisions seemed to avoid the direct question raised by 
Justice Brennan.3 
The 1999 decision in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.4 
ended the debate: for the first time the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed an award of 
damages ($1.45 million) to a landowner on a “takings” case.  The Court also held 
that the property owners were entitled to a jury trial on key factual questions (e.g., 
reasonableness of the city’s actions, whether the owners were deprived of an 
economically viable use, and the ultimate question of liability).5 As a result, one 
commentator predicted “there will be a chilling effect on [cities’] willingness to deny 
                                                                
2San Diego Gas and Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (1981) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
3See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304 (1987)  (asserting in dicta that the landowner can recover monetary damages for 
a “temporary taking,” but reversing and remanding the case for further state court 
proceedings); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (invalidating 
regulation of California Coastal Commission that would have required landowner to convey a 
public access easement, but declaring no monetary damages); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (declaring that a regulation prohibiting development within 
certain distance of shore constituted a taking, but remanding for further state court proceedings 
that included opportunity for landowner to obtain a permit to construct his proposed homes); 
and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (invalidating city’s requirements that store 
owner dedicate a floodplain area and a bikeway on the grounds that such exactions were not 
“roughly proportionate” to the impact of the owner’s expansion project, but declaring no 
monetary damages). 
4526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
5Id. at 720-21. 
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development proposals on grounds that are not broadly understood by the general 
public…”6 
In the interest of mitigating this chilling effect, this article proposes a model of 
“internal rules and operating procedures” that planning offices can use to minimize 
the threat of liability for negligent planning.  The Article identifies a device familiar 
to most planners–the five-year policies plan–as an integral component of the model.  
However, I propose a new format of the plan that achieves a closer tie between the 
purposes motivating planners to regulate and the legal tests employed by courts in 
their review of these regulations. 
The model is admittedly a simplification of complex processes: the simplification 
consists of a synthesis of land use case law into a practical guide for a planning 
office.  This Article constructs a conservative legal framework to guide planners in 
conventional planning activities.  It further proposes that planners should apply the 
model to these conventional activities, but work closely with the municipal attorney 
before adopting more innovative and controversial planning devices. 
This Article proceeds in four major sections.  Section I commences, with 
historical reviews: major changes in land use planning within the last 50 years, the 
land development problems associated with those changes, and judicial responses to 
these same problems.  Comparisons are frequently made between cases from a 
rustbelt Midwestern state (Ohio) and cases from a faster growing sunbelt state (North 
Carolina).  Section I concludes by assessing the case law’s effectiveness (as both a 
check on the abuse of planning powers and a guide for planning offices) and by 
previewing a responsive planning model. 
The remainder of the Article develops the office procedures model.  The office 
procedures are grouped under three major headings:  Section II discusses long range 
planning procedures, Section III discusses implementation of planning policies 
through ordinance drafting and mapping, and Section IV discusses the day-to-day 
administration of planning regulations. 
The model’s focus on case law proscriptions imposes several limitations.  First, 
the model does not incorporate requirements imposed by planning enabling 
legislation.  For purposes of this Article, I assume that local planners can choose the 
form of their land use plan.  However, in some states–most notably California and 
Florida7–planning enabling legislation has been revised to mandate local planning 
and specify particular plan elements.  The regulation of the form of the plan through 
such enabling legislation may render many of the model’s elements inapplicable to 
local planning in these states. 
Second, many states have enacted administrative procedure acts that may apply 
to the administration of local land use regulations.8 Consequently, the 
recommendations offered in Section IV should be considered only after the 
municipal attorney has outlined the procedural framework required by such acts.  
Finally, the enactment of environmental impact legislation in some states requires 
                                                                
6TERRY D. MORGAN, LITIGATING THE LAND USE CASE: MUNICIPAL DEFENSES, INST. ON 
PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN §  9.01(3) (1999). 
7CAL. GOV’T. CODE  §§ 65350- 65362 (West 1997 & Supp. 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 163.3161-.3245 (West 2000 & Supp. 2002). 
8See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 119.01-.13 (West 1994); N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 150B-1 to–52 
(1999). 
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planners in these jurisdictions to assess impacts of each significant development 
proposal.  While this Article proposes environmental planning through advance 
designation of land suitability rather than a case-by-case review,9 planning offices 
subject to environmental impact legislation must continue to employ the case-by-
case review procedures contemplated by such acts. 
I.  PLANNING POWERS AND JUDICIAL CONTROLS:  A BRIEF HISTORY 
Public land use planning is a relatively new discipline, and authorities will agree 
that the public regulation of land use is primarily a 20th century development.  New 
York’s 1916 zoning ordinance is generally regarded as the first enactment of 
comprehensive land use regulations in this country.10  This ordinance, and most 
ordinances following it during the next thirty years, were primarily a response to 
urban problems: congestion, overpopulation, and the haphazard location of uses.  
With limited exceptions,11 zoning was a tool used exclusively by incorporated 
municipalities. 
After the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the use of zoning in the 1926 Village of 
Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Company12 decision and set general parameters on the 
use of the tool in a subsequent decision,13 the Court proceeded to abandon the field 
for more than forty years.  Consequently, state courts faced the task of developing 
the more specific rules applicable to zoning regulation.  These courts responded by 
developing, in effect, a “common law” of zoning.  Although the rules developed in 
the state court decisions were roundly criticized,14 prior to 1950, the limited 
geographic application and the limited objectives under the zoning function 
combined to effectively constrict the range of obstacles placed before private land 
developers. 
A.  Major Changes In Land Use Planning: 1950-2000  
The unprecedented suburbanization that began in America in the late 1940’s 
opened up a new array of land use problems, and planners gradually added 
corresponding elements to their respective work programs as a result.  Most of these 
new powers were sorely needed to give planners effective control over frequently 
haphazard suburban development.  However, increased land regulation brought with 
                                                                
9For an article supporting advance designation of environmental areas rather than case-by-
case review, see Donald Hagman, NEPA’s Progeny Inhabit the States - Were the Genes 
Defective?, 7 URB. L. ANN. 3, 46-47 (1974). 
101 KENNETH H. YOUNG, ANDERSON’S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.07 (4th ed. 1995).  
See generally Raphael Fischler, The Metropolitan Dimension of Early Zoning: Revisiting the 
1916 New York City Ordinance, 64 J. AMER. INST. PLANNERS 170 (1998). 
11The state of Wisconsin, which is generally considered a leader in the regulation of land 
use, authorized rural zoning in 1929.  Erling D. Solberg, Rural Zoning in the United States, 
AGRIC. INFO. BULLETIN. 59, U.S.D.A. (1952), cited in JACOB H. BEUSCHER & ROBERT R. 
WRIGHT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 324 (1969). 
12272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
13Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
14See, e.g., Norman Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 317, 318-19 (1955). 
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it undesirable byproducts: fewer housing choices and higher housing costs.  The new 
planning elements and the problems associated with their use are separately 
discussed below. 
1. The Expanding Scope of Land Use Planning 
At least four major additions to the scope of planning practice can be identified: 
comprehensive land coverage, additional objectives, greater emphasis on 
implementation of plans, and increasing use of discretionary review practices. 
a. Comprehensive land coverage–Outside of Wisconsin,15 countywide zoning 
was exceedingly rare prior to 1960.  The planners’ main arenas were developed 
urban areas and those select suburbs that used zoning to protect community property 
values.  As long as land developers had the option of building in unregulated rural 
areas, they avoided any harshness present in the municipal zoning ordinance by 
simply “leapfrogging” outside the city limits.  Yet as area-wide zoning gained 
increasing acceptance, developers’ choices contracted and excessive zoning 
requirements began directly impacting land developers and their housing and 
commercial customers. 
b. Additional objectives–From the original health and safety-based regulations, 
supplemented with zoning ordinances regulating the relationship of urban land uses, 
the scope of planning controls widened to embrace a whole new set of suburban and 
rurally-oriented objectives: environmental quality, growth management, fiscal and 
energy efficiency, preservation of open space, preservation of prime farm and forest 
land, and preservation of a quiet, rural lifestyle.16 
c. Increased emphasis on plan implementation—While traditional land use 
planning viewed the preparation of an idealized future land use map as its key 
function, current practice considers “plan implementation” as an equally important 
function.   
Since mid-century, the nature of the plan has evolved from an elitist, 
inspirational, long range vision that was based on fiscally innocent 
implementation advice, to a framework for community consensus on 
future growth that is supported by fiscally grounded actions to manage 
change.  Subject matter has expanded to include the natural as well as the 
built environment.  Format has shifted from simple policy statements and 
a single large-scale map of future land use… to a more complex 
combination of text, data, maps and time tables.17 
The original isolation of land use planning from the specific, short-range battles 
over property rights had caused many planners in the 1950s and 1960s to question 
the effectiveness of the profession.18 However, by the late 1960s a notable shift had 
                                                                
15See BEUSCHER & WRIGHT, supra note 11. 
16See 1 YOUNG, supra note 10, § 2.03. 
17Edward J. Kaiser & David R. Godschalk, Twentieth Century Land Use Planning: A 
Stalwart Family Tree, 61 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N. 365, 368 (1995). 
18See, e.g., Martin Meyerson, Building the Middle Range Bridge for Comprehensive 
Planning, 22 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N. 58 (1956); Constance Perin, A Noiseless Secession From the 
Comprehensive Plan, 33 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N. 336 (1967). 
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taken place: more and more planners were concentrating their efforts on short-range 
implementation measures.19 
One aspect of this new emphasis on effectiveness was planners’ assertion of 
greater control over the traditional regulatory devices–zoning and subdivision 
regulations.  Additionally, planners began exerting control over the timing and 
location of capital improvements.  Although the manipulation of capital 
improvements to produce desired land development patterns was discussed as early 
as 1955,20 the concept was not widely employed until after the Town of Ramapo’s 
sophisticated capital improvements program was upheld in a landmark 1972 New 
York case.21  Since that time, a variety of measures–sewer moratoria, facility sizing, 
service area policies, detailed staging policies—have been effectively applied by an 
increasing number of communities.22 
d. Increased use of discretionary review–One of the most significant recent 
trends in planning is the increased exercise of discretion in decisionmaking.23  This is 
a marked departure from the purpose of zoning as conceived in the 1924 Standard 
Zoning Enabling Act.24 At the commencement of this trend in the early 1970’s, 
Professor Michael Brough commented as follows: 
The theory held that most development would occur in the manner 
prescribed by the regulations applicable to the various districts, and 
deviations from the preset rules (through use of variances, special 
exceptions or zoning amendments) would occur only in exceptional cases.  
But as the system evolved, use of these three devices, and their more 
                                                                
19The following passage is illustrative: 
The current economic situation facing cities, both growing and mature, is bringing a 
new fiscal orientation to planning.  Traditional physically oriented planning is being 
transformed into budget-oriented planning.  Where once planners concentrated on the 
future design of the city, now they are concerned about bringing some order into day-
to-day decisions.  Planning is becoming more modest and less visionary, shorter range 
and more political. 
American Planning Association, Local Capital Improvements and Development Management 
47 (1980). 
20Henry Fagin, Regulating the Timing of Urban Development, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 298 (1955). 
21Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 
(1972). 
22See generally AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, supra note 19; R. TABORS, et. al., 
LAND USE AND THE PIPE 109-31 (1976); John S. Herbrand, Annotation, Validity of 
Municipality’s Ban on Construction Until Public Facilities Comply With Specific Standards, 
92 A.L.R. 3d 1073 (1980); David J. Oliveiri, Annotation, Validity of Zoning Ordinance 
Deferring Residential Development Until Establishment of Public Services in Area, 63 A.L.R. 
3d 1184 (1975); Barbara A. Ramsey, Note, Conrol of the Timing and Location of Government 
and Utility Extensions, 26 STAN. L. REV. 945 (1974); Robert H. Freilich & John W. Ragsdale, 
Timing and Sequential Controls-The Essential Basis for Effective Regional Planning: An 
Analysis of the New Directions for Land Use Control in the Minneapolis-St. Paul 
Metropolitan Region, 58 MINN. L. REV. 1009 (1974). 
23AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, STREAMLINING LAND USE REGULATION 5 (1980). 
24U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (1924). 
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sophisticated progeny-planned unit developments, floating zones, contract 
and conditional zoning, etc.–became so widespread that . . . a system 
originally conceived to permit development by legal right in accordance 
with specified criteria has now evolved into a system requiring specific 
development permission in most instances.25 
2.  Land Development Costs Associated with Planning Trends 
Land use planners made considerable strides in the last half of the 20th century.  
Planners expanded the geographic scope of their activities, incorporated a wider 
array of environmentally and fiscally related objectives, achieved greater 
effectiveness through an expanding mix of growth management techniques, and 
subjected individual development proposals to more intense scrutiny. 
Unfortunately (as Professor Brough envisioned in the early 1970s), governmental 
bodies given new powers also acquired “new opportunities to interfere arbitrarily or 
maliciously with legitimate private prerogatives.”26 The expanded planning develop-
ments discussed above are at least partly responsible for significant increases in land 
development costs during the past thirty years.  The most obvious causes of these 
cost increases are additional substantive requirements, time delays, less developable 
land, and less predictability in land use review procedures.   
a. Additional substantive requirements–The most direct cost impacts are those in 
which the government requires developers to install improvements that would not be 
constructed in the absence of regulations.27 Common requirements include 
sidewalks, underground utilities, underground storm drainage, curbs and gutters.  
More sophisticated requirements include land reservations for future highway, parks 
and other community facilities.28 
b. Time delays— Studies in Sacramento in 1990,29 and in Houston in 1980,30 have 
demonstrated that longer development review times, coupled with more complex 
procedures and uncertain outcomes, can significantly increase housing costs.  
c. Restricting the supply of developable land–When planning areas institute 
“growth controls” (e.g., population caps, urban service areas, large lot zoning) in a 
manner which substantially restricts the supply of prime developable land, the 
                                                                
25Michael Brough, Flexibility Without Arbitrariness in the Zoning System: Observations 
on North Carolina’s Special Exception and Zoning Amendment Cases, 53 N.C. L. REV. 925, 
925-26 (1975).  See also, Craig A. Peterson, Flexibility in Rezonings and Related Government 
Land Use Decisions, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 499 (1975). 
26Brough, supra note 25, at 926. 
27A thorough economic discussion of these requirements appears in Ellickson, Suburban 
Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L. J. 385 (1977). 
28Infra note 120. 
29IRA B. LOWRY & BRUCE W. FERGUSON, DEVELOPMENT REGULATION AND HOUSING 
AFFORDABILITY 143-48 (1992). 
30RICE CENTER FOR COMMUNITY DESIGN AND RESEARCH, TECHNICAL REPORT: THE DELAY 
COSTS OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION IN THE HOUSTON HOUSING MARKET (1980). 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss4/4
2001] RISK MANAGEMENT FOR LAND USE REGULATIONS 599 
 
impact on real estate prices can be significant.31  A 1992 study of Sacramento County 
estimated that development regulations added $26,000 to the cost of a typical new 
home (or about one-fifth the cost of the $131,000 median sales price.)32  
d. Lack of predictability–Prior to the 1970’s, few discussions of development cost 
impact of land use regulations cited “predictability of public review” as a major 
factor.  While corporate lawyers stress the importance of preventive law in the 
conduct of businesses’ day-to-day activities,33 the elements of “predictability” and 
“preventive law” are frequently missing in the land development business.  This is 
particularly problematic in communities where most public decisions are made 
through case-by-case project reviews.  As Lake County, Illinois Planning Director 
Lane Kendig noted in 1980, “ad hoc procedures make the role of planning unclear at 
best and futile at worst . . . the results have been inconsistent, highly subjective and 
too often politically motivated.”34 
B.  Legal Tests Applied to Land Use Regulations 
In the mid 1970’s, many state and federal courts undertook a more active review 
of land use regulations.  In part, this legal development was a judicial response to the 
land development cost factors discussed above. In his five-volume series, 
AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW, Professor Norman Williams observed that 
prevailing attitudes toward land use regulations have gone through five stages.  The 
third stage–faith in local autonomy–was then (and arguably is still today) the 
majority rule. 
During this period, the courts have given great respect to decisions on 
zoning by various local agencies . . . The change in attitude has been 
expressed in various ways- a genuine presumption of validity which 
controls unless a strong case is made to the contrary, the rule that zoning 
is valid when the case is fairly debatable, etc.35 
Nevertheless, by 1988, Williams had detected the emergence of a fourth stage 
(sophisticated judicial review by state courts) and a possible fifth stage (re-assertion 
of federal oversight of land use).36 The respective state and federal courts developed 
tighter review standards during the 1970’s and 1980’s as they attempted to arbitrate 
disputes clustered under the label of “exclusionary zoning.”  The legal tests included: 
the “comprehensive plan requirement,” substantive due process, equal protection, 
procedural due process, and antitrust. 
                                                                
31See Ellickson, supra note 27, at 434 n.131, partly attributes the astounding increase 
(101% between 1968 and 1975) in Washington, D.C. area housing prices to the “simultaneous 
takeover of Fairfax, Montgomery and Prince Georges counties by anti-development politicians 
in the early 1970s,” citing Donald P. Baker, D.C. Area is Most Expensive Place in U.S. to Buy 
a House, WASH. POST, August 3, 1975, at A1. 
32LOWRY & FERGUSON, supra note 29, at 4. 
33See, e.g., Hodge O’Neal, Preventive Law: Tailoring the Corporate Form of Business to 
Ensure Fair Treatment of All, 49 MISS. L. J. 529 (1978). 
34LANE KENDIG, PERFORMANCE ZONING 281 (1980). 
351 NORMAN WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 5.04 (2d ed. 1988). 
36Id. at §§ 5.05-.07 (fourth stage) and § 5.08 (fifth stage). 
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1.  Revival of Interest in the Planning Base of Zoning 
By the 1970’s, academic commentators had energetically tackled the question of 
the relationship between comprehensive planning and zoning controls.37  Many state 
zoning enabling laws included requirements that zoning be “in accordance with a 
comprehensive plan.”38  Two policy questions lie at the root of these statutory 
expressions: what are the community’s planning objectives, and what means have 
the community’s planners chosen to accomplish these objectives?39 
After over fifty years (1925-1980) of benign neglect by politicians and courts, the 
original statutory requirements acquired new vitality in two respects.  First, since 
1980 there has been a significant increase in the number of states requiring that 
zoning be in accordance with a real and distinct comprehensive plan.40  Second, 
judicial review of these requirements evolved from early mechanical tests toward 
more searching tests scrutinizing the suitability of the communities’ planning 
backgrounds.41 
2.  Increased Substantive Due Process Scrutiny 
The basic examination under a substantive due process challenge to a legislative 
scheme consists of a two pronged test: (1) does the legislative enactment address 
permissible state police power objectives, and (2) is the specific enactment 
reasonably related to these 1egitimate objectives?42  As New Jersey Supreme Court 
                                                                
37See Daniel Mandelkar, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use 
Regulations, 74 MICH. L. REV. 899 (1976); A. Dan Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use 
Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of K.R.S. Chapter 100, 56 KY. 
L. J. 556 (1968); Charles M. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 353 (1955); and Charles M. Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive 
Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955).  For analyses of the requirement in Ohio and North 
Carolina, see Robert F. Benintendi, Note, The Role of the Comprehensive Plan in Ohio: 
Moving Away From the Traditional View, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 207 (1991); Kenneth G. 
Silliman, A Practical Interpretation of North Carolina’s Comprehensive Plan Requirement, 7 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 1 (1984). 
38See, e.g., N.C. GEN STAT. § 160A-383 (cities), id. § 153A-341 (counties) (1999); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 713.07 (cities), id. § 303.05 (counties), and id. § 519.02 (townships) (West 
1994). 
39See Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, supra note 37, at 1155. 
40As of 1993, 24 states had enacted some form of mandatory planning legislation.  Ann 
Strong, et al., Property Rights and Takings, 62 J. AMER. INST. PLANNERS 5, 9 (1996). 
41See 1 WILLIAMS, supra note 35, § 23.03 (mechanical tests) and id. § 23.04 (real 
substance).  North Carolina and Ohio have required scant planning foundations for zoning 
decisions.  See A-S-P Associates v. City of Raleigh, 258 S.E.2d 444 (N.C. 1979) and 
Columbia Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Montgomery, 564 N.E.2d 455 (Ohio 1990), cert. denied, 501 
U.S. 1231 (1991). 
42San Antonio Indep. School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973); Pearson v. City 
of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1223 (6th Cir. 1992); Curto v. City of Harper Woods, 954 F.2d 
1237, 1242 (6th Cir. 1992); Fred P. French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 350 
N.E.2d 381, 386 (N.Y. 1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); A-S-P Associates v. 
City of Raleigh, 258 S.E.2d 444, 448-49 (N.C. 1979); State ex rel. Shemo v. City of Mayfield 
Heights, 765 N.E.2d 345, 350-52 (Ohio 2002); Goldberg Cos., Inc. v. Richmond Hts. City 
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Justice Hall stated in his classic dissent in the 1962 case of Vickers v. Township 
Committee of Gloucester Township,43 these questions were often buried under 
presumptions of validity of municipal action and judicial reluctance to inquire into 
the actual setting of a zoning case.  However by 1980, some courts had begun to 
return to a more realistic and searching analysis of the range of permissible 
objectives and the relationship between specific land use controls and these 
objectives.44 
3.  Equal Protection Analysis 
Analyses of ordinances under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution,45 and similar clauses in most state constitutions, traditionally proceed 
on a two-tier basis.  The strict scrutiny test, used to test the reasonableness of 
classifications involving fundamental rights46 and suspect classifications,47 embodies 
a searching inquiry into legislative purposes.  By contrast, the rational basis test, 
usually applied to land use classifications, will uphold the classification if there is 
any reasonable basis for the difference in regulatory treatment.48 Traditionally, 
application of this test has yielded results similar to those obtained under the 
deferential due process analysis discussed above, and land use ordinances are rarely 
invalidated. 
However, the rational basis test also began changing in the early 1980’s.49  By the 
turn of the century, there were indications that future planners may have to 
                                                          
Council, 690 N.E.2d 510, 512, 514-15 (Ohio 1998).  Presbytery of  Seattle v. King County, 
787 P.2d 907, 913 (Wash. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 911 (1990). 
43181 A.2d 129, cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 371 U. S. 233 (1962). 
44See generally MacGibbon v. Bd. of Appeals of Duxbury, 340 N.E.2d 487, 489-92 (Mass. 
1976); See also 1 WILLIAMS, supra note 35, at § 5.05-.06. 
45U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
46For a summary of cases involving fundamental interests, see Gerald Gunther, Foreward: 
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 
86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-9, 12-20 (1972). 
47For a summary of cases involving suspect classifications, see id. at 9-10, 12-20. 
48Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 262 (1980); Young v. American Mini Theaters, 
Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 71 (1976); Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1, 8 (1973). 
49In 1972, Professor Gerald Gunther observed that the U. S. Supreme Court appeared to be 
recognizing a middle ground between the strict scrutiny and rational basis tests.  He described 
the characteristics of this new test as follows:  
Stated most simply, it would have the Court take seriously a constitutional 
requirement that has never been formally abandoned: that legislative means must 
substantially further legislative ends . . .  Extreme deference to imaginable supporting 
facts and conceivable legislative purposes was characteristic of the “hands off” 
attitude of the old equal protection.  Putting consistent new bite into the old equal 
protection would mean that the Court would be less willing to supply justifying 
rationales by exercising its imagination.  It would have the Court assess the means in 
terms of legislative purposes that have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in 
conjecture.  Moreover, it would have the Justices gauge the reasonableness of 
questionable means on the basis of materials that are offered to the Court, rather than 
resorting rationalization created by perfunctory judicial hypthesizing. 
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specifically document the existence of a problem and the need for the particular 
legislative classification offered as a solution.50 
4.  Procedural Due Process Challenges 
Procedural attacks upon land use ordinances, based on the Due Process Clause of 
the federal51 and most state constitutions, have greatly increased in the last twenty 
years.  Due Process requires that an individual be given adequate notice and an 
opportunity for a hearing before she is deprived of a significant property interest.52 
The ordinance must give individuals sufficient warning to allow them to conduct 
themselves in a manner so as to avoid illegal actions.53  Further, the content of the 
                                                          
Gunther, supra note 46, at 20-21.  Gunther’s new test was enthusiastically embraced by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Boraas v. Vill. of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 
815 (2d Cir. 1973), rev’d, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); however, the subsequent reversal of this decision 
by the U.S. Supreme Court, Village, supra note 48, appeared at the time to  foreclose the 
application of the Gunther test in federal equal protection land use decisions.  But see cases 
cited at note 50 infra.  Nevetheless, in the mid-1970s several state courts began applying more 
rigorous standards in their review of land use classifications under their own equal protection 
clauses.  See Sands Point Harbor, Inc. v. Sullivan, 346 A.2d 612, 614 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1975) (upholding the classification only after court review of testimony and specific 
legislative findings); Toms River Affiliates v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 355 A.2d 679, 686 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (upholding, again, the classification only after searching review of 
testimony and findings); Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake, 211 N.W.2d 471, 475-77 (Wis. 1973) 
(scrutinizing the methods by which an agricultural classification was devised and holding that 
no rational basis existed for the classification). 
50See, e.g., Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of  Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 698-
707 (1999); Alvarez v. Chavez, 886 P.2d 461, 466-67 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (applying a 
heightened scrutiny test). 
51U. S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
52Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-69 (1970); Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 230 
(1950). Cf. Fruman v. City of Detroit, 1 F. Supp. 2d. 665 (6th Cir. 1998) (entering summary 
judgment for owner of demolished building on procedural due process claim and de facto 
taking and inverse condemnation claims) with  Harris v. City of Akron, 20 F.3d 1396 (6th Cir. 
1994) (denying building owner’s wrongful demolition claim after the owner had alleged 
inadequate notice and hearing provisions), reh. denied, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1001 (1994). 
53Yater v. Hancock County Planning Comm’n., 614 N.E.2d 568, 573 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), 
reh. denied, transfer denied, cert. denied 511 U. S. 1019 (1993); Lebanon v. Wergowske, 590 
N.E.2d 902, 904 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).  These general due process principles have been 
interpreted as follows in the context of land use regulations: 
The reason for that rule, the court noted, was the necessity for notice to those affected 
by the operation and effect of the ordinance. . . .   The restriction on property rights 
must be declared as a rule of law in the ordinance and not left to the uncertainty of 
proof by extrinsic evidence.   
James D. Lawlor, Annotation, Validity, Construction and Effect of Agreement to Rezone, or 
Amendment to Zoning Ordinance, Creating Special Restrictions or Conditions Not Applicable 
to Other Property Similarly Situated, 70 A.L.R. 3d 125, 182 (1976), citing Harnett v. Austin, 
93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956) (emphasis added). 
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hearing is important; the decision-maker must be an impartial one and she must 
reach her decision according to articulable standards.54 
Prior to 1980, procedural due process attacks on land use controls were rare.  
Their prominence today is a specific response to communities’ increasing use of 
discretionary review techniques.  Developers now assert due process claims to attack 
procedures for review of special use permits (and their more sophisticated 
environmental counterparts).  Although there are differences, and some confusion 
associated with the various discretionary review devices, the basic components are 
similar. 
In a typical special use permit (sometimes known as a “conditional use permit”) 
ordinance, the legislature requires administrative review (usually with preset 
conditions) prior to final approval of a proposed development.  When all these preset 
conditions can be addressed in objective fashion (e.g., size of parcel, distance from 
public utilities) there is little need for procedural protections.55  Most ordinances, 
however, establish conditions that are extremely subjective (e.g., whether the use 
threatens public health and safety).  Additionally, many of the ordinances delegate 
permit decisions to planning boards or boards of adjustment.  In these latter 
situations, courts have established a set of procedural safeguards that usually include 
a right to sworn testimony, a right of cross-examination, and findings and 
conclusions based on the evidence adduced at the hearing.56 
5.  Federal and State Antitrust Laws 
In the late 1970’s, developer land use lawsuits began raising both federal and 
state antitrust challenges.  These attacks were in part enabled by U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions that narrowed the scope of municipal immunity under federal antitrust 
laws.57  Although Congress’ passage of the Local Government Antitrust Act of 
198458 partially stemmed this tide of litigation, some developers’ attorneys continue 
to allege anti-competitive city activities in their lawsuits.  While successful attacks 
                                                                
54Rose v. Village of Peninsula, 875 F. Supp. 442 (N.D. Ohio 1995); see Note, 
Developments in the Law- Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1525 (1978). 
55Brough, supra note 25, at 929. 
56Zylka v. City of Crystal, 167 N.W.2d 45, 50-51 (Minn. 1969); Humble Oil and Refining 
Co. v. Bd. of Aldermen, 202 S.E.2d 129, 137 (N.C. 1974); In re Rocky Point Plaza Corp., 621 
N.E.2d 566, 572 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). 
57At the federal level, cf. Cmty. Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 
(1982) and City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389 (1978) with Parker v. 
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).  At the state “unfair trade practices” level, see Wal-Mart Stores 
v. Am. Drugs, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 30 (Ark. 1995) (finding Wal-Mart not liable of unlawful 
predatory pricing). 
58The Local Government Antritrust Act of 1984 protects local governments, and officials 
and empoyees thereof acting in an official capacity, against liability for damages, costs and 
attorney fees for antitrust violations.  15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1994).  The Act does not bar 
injunction actions, nor does it bar claims against officials or employees not acting in an 
official capacity. Id. 
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are exceedingly rare in the land use area, careful municipal attorneys should acquaint 
themselves with the available immunity defenses.59 
C. Effectiveness of the Legal Tests 
1.  In Addressing Housing Cost and Housing Choice Problems  
Generally, when applied, the legal tests have adequately addressed the more 
blatant governmental attempts to exclude low-cost housing from a particular 
jurisdiction.60  However, to date, the legal tests have rarely addressed the general cost 
impacts and the restricted housing choices engendered by overly restrictive 
ordinances.61 
                                                                
59Antitrust actions will fail if the land use restriction falls within the “state action” 
exemption announced in Parker.  317 U.S. at 341.  There is a two step test: “First, the state 
legislature must have authorized the action under challenge.  Second, the legislature must have 
intended to displace competition with regulation.” Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs v. City of 
Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1120 (10th Cir. 1991).  With respect to the first requirement, the 
Ohio Revised Code does contains numerous specific authorizations for land use regulation, 
see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 711.001-.040; id .§ 713.01-.34 (West 1994); whether any of 
these sections can be viewed as satisfying the second requirement of the ‘state action” 
exemption (i.e., whether the legislation intends “to displace competition with regulation”) will 
depend upon the particular facts of the case.  However, even if a court should determine that a 
‘state action” exemption is unavailable, other anititrust defenses may still save the ordinance.  
For example, a city could argue that the restriction complies with the “rule of reason” in that it 
is no more restrictive of competition than required to achieve the city’s public objectives.  See 
Susman & White, The Perspective of a Plaintiff’s Lawyer, in J. SIENA, ANTITRUST & LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 28-30 (1982). 
60See, e.g., cases cited infra note 135. 
61The following two practical observations are illustrative:   
Many attorneys feel that even if developers win in court, they still “lose” if the result 
of litigation is a remand to the local governing body with instructions to act in 
conformance with the court’s decision.  Such action does not guarantee that the 
developer will achieve what was wanted. 
FRANK SCHNIDMAN, et al., HANDLING THE LAND USE CASE § 5.3.3 (1984). 
Actually, dozens of conditions of doubtful validity imposed on developers are as a 
practical fact accepted by them and not contested in court.  The developer is after all a 
businessman anxiously awaiting the day when he can begin realizing on his substantial 
investment by selling lots or lots and houses.  A court review may delay that day for a 
long time.  In addition, he may be quite anxious not to arouse the antagonism of the 
very local officials before whom he may again be shortly appearing and asking 
approval for another subdivision.  Finally, he may be able to pass the additional cost of 
the imposed condition on to his customer.   
BEUSCHER & WRIGHT, supra note 11, at 286. 
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The root causes of the cost increases – time delays,62 lack of predictability,63 and 
restricted supply of developable land,64 are only now being challenged in the courts.  
If more developers object to these tactics in their future land use lawsuits, the 
constitutional doctrines may sometimes offer solutions.  The real question is whether 
a significant number of developers will start to challenge these more subtle impacts 
on housing costs and housing choices.  A significant, recent Ohio decision may open 
the floodgates—in that state and other states—to developers’ monetary delay 
claims.65 
2.  In Setting Guidelines for Planning Activities 
There are elements in the legal tests that can be translated into guidelines suitable 
for use in a planning office.  Unfortunately, there have been few attempts to gather 
the various rules into a package that makes sense to most planners.  The result–
except in departments actively counseled by planning law experts–is that the legal 
principles guiding most planners’ work consist of bits and pieces of important case 
holdings as summarized in various trade journals.  The planning staff rarely 
assembles the separate case holdings into a coherent set of principles.  Such an 
endeavor requires legal training; it is seemingly a task for the municipal attorney, not 
the planner. 
Unfortunately, many municipal attorneys are reluctant to prepare a “cookbook of 
legal principles” for the planning office.  These attorneys will assert that case 
                                                                
62See State ex rel. Kmart Corp. v. Westlake Planning Comm’n, 624 N.E.2d 714 (Ohio 
1994) (rejecting planning commission’s contention that all of the information was not yet 
submitted, and determining that a 60-day period for the commission to approve or reject plans 
began to run at the end of an extension period). But cf. River Park Inc. v. City of Highland 
Park, 23 F.3d 164 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that time delay does not violate due process or equal 
protection clauses); Licari v. Ferruzi, 22 F.3d 344 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding time delay not a 
violation); Orange Lake Assoc., Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 21 F. 3d 1214 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding time 
delay not a violation); and PFZ Properties v. Rodriguez, 928 F. 2d 28 (1st Cir. 1991) 
(upholding district court’s dismissal of a developer’s procedural due process, substantive due 
process and equal protection challenges to a review process extending over at least four years 
and culminating in an eventual refusal to process plans), cert. dismissed, 503 U. S. 256 (1992). 
63There are threads of this contention in Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of 
Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 698-707 (1999) (upholding $1.45 million jury verdict in which the 
record included city’s separate suggestions to the developer that densities of 264 units, then 
224 units, then 190 units would be acceptable.  Yet, city still denied each proposal after the 
developer had in each instance prepared plans in reliance on the city’s statements).  As stated 
in an old English case, “(A) law which a man cannot obey, nor act according to it, is void and 
no law: and it is impossible to obey contradictions, or act according to them.”  Vaughn, C.J., 
in Thomas v. Sorrell (1677), cited in FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33, 63-65 (1969); cases 
and Lawlor, supra  note 53. 
64Cont’l Bldg. Co. Inc. v. Town of N. Salem, 625 N.Y.S.2d 700, 211 A.D.2d 88 (N.Y. 
1995) (striking down ordinance that devoted less than 1% of town’s residentially-zoned land 
to “as of right” multi-family development). 
65State ex rel. Shemo v. City of Mayfield Heights, 765 N.E.2d 345 (Ohio 2002) (finding a 
temporary taking extending over an eight-year time period due to city’s restrictive zoning 
regulation); upon rehearing, the eight-year period was shortened to six years.  State ex rel. 
Shemo v. City of Mayfield Heights, 775 N.E.2d 493, 498 (Ohio 2002). 
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holdings contain subtle distinctions incapable of being summarized in “black-letter 
rules.”  Further, municipal attorneys who are unfamiliar with planning methods and 
processes will encounter difficulty devising legal principles tailored to the daily 
functions of the planning office. 
Yet, the fundamental planning principles learned by planners during their 
education or in practice are not vastly different from some of the tests employed by 
the courts in their review of planning activities. An effective legal guide for a 
planning office must build on these similarities.  Specifically, the Substantive Due 
Process test discussed above can form the core of a reorganized planning process. 
First, consider the objectives of planning.  The comprehensive planning process 
begins with the specification of goals and objectives.  Similarly, the first prong of the 
Substantive Due Process test asks whether an ordinance is motivated by a 
permissible police power objective.  Traditionally, planning objectives are 
categorized under physical development headings–residential, commercial, 
industrial, open space–while the police power “nouns” used by lawyers include 
public health, public safety, and public welfare (as defined in particular decisions).  
To the extent that planners can re-phrase their objectives so that they more generally 
track the police power nouns,66 their various planning studies, which document the 
need for action on a planning objective, will also serve as useful evidence in future 
court actions. 
Second, consider the implementation of plans.  Under traditional planning theory, 
the implementation phase of planning consists of the search for “a course of action 
which best achieves the stated objectives.”67  The authors of a standard text on urban 
land use planning, who refer to a collection of implementation measures as a 
“guidance system,” offered the following standards: 
1. Guidance system approaches should be formulated which 
employ the least costly tools and interject the least interference 
with the land market, consistent with achieving a degree of 
control necessary to serve the intended purpose . . . 
2. Regulations should not be more restrictive of uses than is 
necessary to achieve the public purpose being sought. 
3. A guidance system should cause as few “windfalls” and 
“wipeouts” as possible, regardless of their legality, 
4. Costs should, as much as possible, be distributed to those 
receiving the benefits (except for those strategies pursuing 
income redistribution). 
5. Facilities and guidance tools efficiently serving multiple 
purposes are preferable to single-purpose facilities and tools.68 
All these statements are consistent with, and actually enhance, the second 
admonition of the Substantive Due Process test: that a legislative scheme be 
                                                                
66For examples of the use of police power objectives in planning texts, see F. STUART 
CHAPIN, JR. & EDWARD KAISER, URBAN LAND USE PLANNING 48-58 (3d ed. 1979); EDWARD 
KAISER, et al., URBAN LAND USE PLANNING 266-68 (4th ed. 1995). 
67R. J. Burby III, Planning and Politics: Toward a Model of Planning-Related Policy 
Outputs in American Local Government (1968) (Unpublished paper: University of North 
Carolina Environmental Policies and Urban Development Thesis Series No. 12). 
68See CHAPIN & KAISER, supra note 66, at 107. 
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rationally related to permissible police power objectives.  Realizing, therefore, that 
legal guidelines for planners can be formulated by recasting the vocabulary but not 
the core theory of land use planning practice, the remainder of this Article constructs 
a model for long-range and current planning activities. 
II.  OFFICE GUIDELINES FOR LONG-RANGE PLANNING 
As noted above, traditional land use planning regarded the production and 
periodic amendment of the long-range (i.e., 20-25 years) comprehensive plan as its 
essential activity.  Further, the essence of the comprehensive plan (as it was then 
defined) consisted of a map indicating detailed future land uses.69 Critics of this 
process have argued for a planning procedure that instead regards a short-term 
(i.e.,five years) policies plan as the key element.  Although maps may be prepared in 
conjunction with such policies plans, they usually consist of general land 
classifications rather than specifications of detailed land uses.70 
This Article’s model is based on the short-term policies plan approach.  The 
long-range planning division of the typical planning office will undertake its policy 
planning in four major phases: planning base studies, the four major elements of the 
plan, goals and objectives of the plan, and a land classification map and short-term 
public action program for the plan.  
A.  The Information Base for the Five-Year Policies Plan 
One of the early steps in the planning process is a survey of basic data relating to 
the community’s physical, economic and social conditions.  Traditionally, these 
basic technical studies are gathered under a few major groupings: 
We can think of phenomena involved in planning analyses in terms of 
major systems, of which there are at least five: economic, population, 
activity, land development, and environmental. In developing the 
information base for these systems, some general guidelines for recording, 
storing, processing and retrieving data are required.  These general 
requirements . . . precede studies of the five systems so that information 
collected in these basic studies can be organized on the basis of certain 
common characteristics.71 
A 1995 urban land use planning textbook provides a good summary of these 
“tooling-up studies.”72  Upon completion of these studies, the planning staff should 
                                                                
69KAISER & GODSCHALK, supra note 17.  As courts have begun to take seriously the 
requirement of conformity with master plans, some serious difficulties have arisen when the 
detailed future land use map is regarded as the essence of the plan.  See, e.g., Green v. 
Hayward, 552 P.2d 815, 817-19 (Ore. 1967). 
70See text associated with note 157.  German land use planning and zoning (which 
preceded American activities by 30 years) used a land classification system.  The inner city 
was divided from the outer city; and the outer city was divided into: “an inner, an outer, and a 
rural zone, in which the permissable height of new buildings and percentage of the lot that 
they may cover progressively decrease.”  Williams, Public Control of Private Real Estate, in 
CITY PLANNING 48, 70-73 (J. Nolen ed. 1928). 
71See CHAPIN & KAISER, supra note 66, at 107. 
72See KAISER, et al., supra note 66, at 85-248. 
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
608 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:591 
 
prepare an executive summary of the technical data.  Over time, the planning staff 
should periodically (e.g., every six months) supply the municipal attorney with a 
brief written summary of additional technical studies being conducted by the 
department.  The executive summary and the periodic updates will enable the 
attorney to suggest modifications that will provide a stronger technical base for 
regulatory actions.   
One of the major functions of the technical studies is to establish an 
informational base out of which the policy plan “findings” grow.  As stated in 
Section II (B) infra, findings and policies will be extremely dependent on public 
comment within the community. 
B. The Plan’s Four Elements: Goals, Police Power Objectives, Findings  
and Policies 
The planning studies discussed in Section II (A) above are designed to provide 
both a snapshot of the community as it now exists and a projection of the community 
as it is most likely to develop.  Once these studies are completed, the planning office 
will have a technical foundation to support the four major elements of the five-year 
policies plan. 
As noted above, the traditional comprehensive plan consists of a set of physical 
development goals and objectives with detailed policies or principles listed under 
each objective.73  By contrast, I propose a policies plan consisting of goals, police 
power objectives, findings and policies.  The goals are ends toward which planning 
efforts are directed: they constitute the most general statements of the police power.  
The police power objectives are the more specific methods by which land use 
planning contributes to the goals.  Findings are short statements summarizing 
existing and future conditions as expressed and predicted in the planning base 
studies.  Policies are guides for future action: they are the recommended methods for 
achieving the objectives, given the current situation as disclosed by the findings. 
Although the goals and police power objectives will generally remain constant 
over time, the findings and policies are dynamic and largely dependent on public 
input.  The long-range planning division should continually monitor (and revise) 
these latter two elements to insure that they always reflect the current state of the 
community. 
The model proposes the following major goal headings: (1) health and safety; (2) 
protection of natural resources; (3) economic efficiency/energy conservation; (4) 
aesthetics (amenity); (5) economic development; and (6) community development.74 
Section II(C) infra, separately addresses these six major goals: within each goal 
category, I will cite specific police power objectives associated with the goal.  I will 
                                                                
73Id. at 342-43. 
74These goal headings are derived (with some modifications) from the discussion of 
“Elements of the Public Interest” in CHAPIN & KAISER, supra note 66, at 48-58.  In summary:   
The public interest is frequently used in law to refer to what the courts will sanction as 
a public purpose. . . .  For example, health, welfare, morals and safety have become 
generally recognized tests of the public interest in American jurisprudence…. 
[however], for planning purposes, a more advanced concept of the public interest is 
warranted, one which builds on the legal tests but seeks forward-looking guideposts.  
Id. at 48. 
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also give some indication of the extent to which the courts have accepted the 
separate objectives as proper exercises of the police power. 
Since findings and policies will depend on the community’s unique 
characteristics, I will not discuss the specifics of these elements in this article.  
However, when planners attempt to develop regulations based on some of the less-
accepted objectives described below, the drafting of the findings and policies are 
critical steps that should be conducted with the assistance of the municipal attorney.75 
Public participation is essential during planning staff’s development of both 
findings and policies.  I recommend two rounds of extensive public participation.  
The first round would commence immediately after the completion of the base 
studies and would solicit the community’s involvement in the identification of, and 
drafting of, the findings based on the technical studies.  Staff members would 
prepare draft policies after its incorporation of public comments into the findings. 
The draft policies would touch off round two of public participation:  at that time, the 
staff would solicit pubic comment (including proposed amendments) on the draft 
policies.76 
C.  The Goals and Police Power Objectives in the Plan   
1.  Protecting the Public Health and Safety 
The protection of the public health and safety is the most basic and most accepted 
exercise of the police power.  Health and safety based controls on land use were 
enacted and enforced in American urban areas prior to the Revolutionary War.77 
Apart from the historical acceptance of such regulations, the very statement “health 
and safety” conveys the urgency of a problem; like the general public, courts are 
quick to respond to such problems.  Accordingly, planning objectives that are related 
to legitimate health and safety concerns should be explicitly categorized as such. 
a.  Exclusion of nuisances from residential areas–The prohibition of nuisances 
(e.g., heavy industries, livery stables) from residential areas is a clearly established 
objective that predates formal zoning.78 
b.  Regulating intense development–Overcrowding, lack of adequate light and air, 
and inadequate open space were all familiar problems to city residents in the late 
19th and 20th centuries.  Bulk regulations designed to curb these problems have long 
been regarded as proper exercises of the police power; more recently, requirements 
                                                                
75A North Carolina appellate court upheld denial of a permit due to conflict with a county 
land use policy.  Everhart & Assoc., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envt’l Health & Natural Res., 493 S.E.2d 
66 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, 502 S.E.2d 590 (N.C. 1998). 
76The Cleveland City Planning Commission used a roughly analagous public participation 
process in its preparation of a 2000 update to the city’s downtown plan. 
77See generally John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern 
Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996). 
78Professor Daniel Mandelkar has stated: 
Courts recognize the land use heirarchy implicit in nuisance cases by granting relief to 
plaintiffs who sue to prohibit noxious nonresidential uses in residential 
neighborhoods.  Nuisance suits against industrial uses seldom present difficulties.   
DANIEL MANDELKAR, LAND USE LAW § 4.05 (4th ed. 1997).  See also Hart, supra note 77, at 
1289-99; Williams, supra note 14, at 331. 
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that dense development be served by urban services (i.e., public water, sewer and 
drainage) have been upheld.79 
c.  Minimizing traffic hazards and traffic congestion–The safety threat posed by 
increased traffic attributed to a proposed multi-family use was a significant factor in 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s validation of zoning in the 1926 Village of Euclid case.80  
Since that time, regulations responding to problems of traffic safety have enjoyed 
favorable treatment by the courts,81 however, Ohio courts have been reluctant to 
embrace this as a “stand-alone” objective.82 
d.  Regulating development in natural hazard areas–The regulation of natural 
hazard areas is a fairly recent development; examples prior to 1970 are rare.  In 
contrast to the objectives above (that deal with relationships between and intensity of 
particular uses), natural hazard area regulations focus on particular geographic areas.  
These areas–including floodplains, ocean beaches and dunes, areas of seismic 
activity and steep slope areas–have particular limitations for development due to 
their natural characteristics. 
Floodplain regulations are increasingly accepted as valid safety measures.83 
Successful attacks on these ordinances have generally focused on applications to 
particular sites rather than the validity of the planning objective.84  The restriction of 
development on ocean beaches and dunes is also receiving favorable treatment from 
the courts.85 Threats posed by erosion and hurricanes supply the public safety 
                                                                
79See Williams, supra note 14, at 332; BEUSCHER & WRIGHT, supra note 11, at 522-23. 
80272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926). 
81See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949); Williams, 
supra note 14, at 332; Allen Fonoroff, The Relationship of Zoning to Traffic Generators, 20 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 238 (1955). 
82While many states have recognized “relative traffic congestion” as an appropriate zoning 
consideration, the State of Ohio has “gone both ways” on this point.  1 WILLIAMS, supra 
note 35, § 10.05.  Cf. Columbia Oldsmobile, 564 N.E.2d 455, 461 (Ohio 1990) (stating that, 
while traffic safety may be insufficient standing alone as an objective,  traffic safety can be 
one factor in a comprehensive analysis) with State ex. rel. Killeen Realty Co. v. City of East 
Cleveland, 160 N.E.2d 1, 8 (Ohio 1959) (stating that traffic regulation must remain a 
“byproduct” of zoning activities). 
83Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387 (1994) (dicta); Turner v. County of Del 
Norte, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 
N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); Responsible Citizens v. City of 
Asheville, 302 S.E.2d 204 (N.C. 1983).  Professor Mandelkar has stated: “Although the 
Supreme Court’s Lucas decision changes taking law as it applies to floodplain regulations, it is 
not likely to change the favorable view most courts had adopted toward floodplain regulation 
under the taking clause.”  MANDELKAR, supra note 78, § 12.06.  See generally Alan 
Weinstein, Revisiting the National Flood Insurance Program, 48 LAND USE LAW & ZONING 
DIGEST (No. 10) 3 (1996); Rebecca  S. Thiem, Note, Various Aspects of Flood Plain Zoning, 
55 N.D. L. REV. 429, 438 (1979); Zygmund J. B. Plater, The Takings Issue in a Natural 
Setting: Floodlines and the Police Power, 52 TEX. L. REV. 201, 218 (1974). 
84See infra notes 177-202, and accompanying text. 
85McNulty v. Town of Indiatlantic, 727 F. Supp. 604 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Adams v. N.C. 
Dep’t of Natural Res. and Cmty. Dev., 249 S.E.2d 402 (N.C. 1980) (upholding North 
Carolina’s Coastal Area Management Act, which provides special protection for ocean hazard 
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rationale for these regulations.  Steep slope areas and areas of high seismic activity 
are now receiving attention, particularly in California.  The objective of discouraging 
development in such areas should be valid;86 regulatory problems here usually stem 
from the difficulty of delineating precise boundaries.87 
e.  Regulating man-made hazards–A number of facilities (e.g., airports, 
refineries, nuclear power plants) present particular risks that demand individualized 
regulatory treatment.  Major state and regional legislative enactments have addressed 
this problem in recent years.88  There is little doubt that the protection against threats 
posed by such facilities is a valid objective.89 
f.  Emergency measures–Occasionally, regulations that would be unlawful as 
permanent measures are upheld as permissible short term (i.e., one-two years) 
emergency measures. Crises such as overburdened sewer lines, contamination of 
water supplies, droughts, and landfill closings all fall within this category.90 
2.  Protecting Natural Resource Areas 
General regulations applicable to natural resource areas have been accepted for 
some time,91 however, the protection of natural resource areas as a separate objective 
for land use controls is a comparatively recent development.  Nevertheless, many 
state courts now recognize natural resource protection as a permissible objective, 
particularly when clear ties to a community’s economic base can be established.92 
The most commonly accepted resource objectives are discussed below.  
Generally, the validity of the objective is no longer the major legal question 
                                                          
areas—and other “areas of environmental concern—against several forms of constitutional 
challenges).  Ocean hazard areas (e.g., beaches, dunes and inlets) are directly exposed to wave, 
wind, and current action.  During storms, these forces are intensified and can cause significant 
changes in the bordering landforms and to structures located on them.  See tit. 15A N.C. 
ADMIN. CODE 7H § .0302 (2002). 
86See, e.g., In re Kiesel, 772 A.2d 135, 139 (Vt. 2000); Girton v. City of Seattle, 983 P.2d 
1135 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).  See generally, Robert B. Olshansky, Planning for Hillside 
Development, AM. PLAN. ASS’N. No. 466 PLAN. ADVISORY SERV. (1996). The total financial 
loss due to slope failures is probably greater than that for such geologic hazards as floods, 
hurricanes, tornadoes and earthquakes.  Fleming, et al., Landslide Hazards and Their 
Reduction, 45 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N. 428 (1979). 
87See infra notes 177-88, and accompanying text. 
88Regarding power plant siting, see, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116C.51-.69 (1997) (2002 
Cum. Annual pocket part); N.Y. PUB. SERV. L. §§ 120-130 (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 30, 
§§ 2901-2925 (2000).  Regarding coastal facilities, see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:19-1 
through 13:19-21 (1991 & Supp. 2001 cum. Annual pocket part).  Regarding heavy industry in 
coastal zone, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 7 §§ 7701-7717 (2001). 
89See, e.g., Kahl v. Consol. Gas & Elec. Light & Power Co., 60 A.2d 754 (Md. 1948), 
cited in 1 YOUNG supra note 10, §§ 7.10, 15.04. 
90See James A. Kushner, Growth Management and the City, 12 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 68, 
71 (1994). 
91An extensive list of early statutes is cited in a 1936 opinion issued by the Solicitor to the 
U. S. Department of Agriculture, reprinted in BEUSCHER & WRIGHT, supra note 11, at 612-15. 
92See infra notes 97 and 100 for cases cited. 
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associated with protection of these areas; instead, the more troubling question 
involves the definition of fair and precise boundaries for the resource areas.93 
a.  Wetlands, shorelands and estuarine waters–Wetlands are transitional areas 
between land and open water characterized by low topography, poor drainage and 
standing water.  Boundaries of wetlands are usually determined by reference to 
predominate water depth, vegetation and salinity of water.94 Shorelines are less 
precisely defined; they are areas, including wetlands, which are adjacent to water 
bodies.95  Estuarine waters are waters found in the mouth of a river or sound where 
the tide flows in.  The natural functions of these areas are closely related.  Wetlands 
protect offshore water resources from pollution, stabilize the water table, and provide 
breeding, nesting, resting and feeding grounds for fish and wildlife.96  Biologists and 
economists have documented the economic contributions of this latter function.97 
Although shoreline areas outside wetland boundaries perform less significant 
natural functions, they have deservedly received protection based on the impact that 
development in these areas can have on wetlands.  Specifically, development in 
upland areas can destroy a wetlands’ filtering function by overloading it with 
nutrient and sediment inflow.98 
Estuaries serve as breeding areas for many commercially important species of 
fish.99  Many states now regard the preservation of these natural resources as a valid 
purpose under the police power.100 However, the definition of reasonable boundaries 
for these areas (particularly shorelands) remains a problem.101 
                                                                
93See infra notes 177-88, and accompanying text. 
94CHARLES THUROW, et al., PERFORMANCE CONTROLS FOR SENSITIVE LANDS:  A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE FOR LOCAL ADMINISTRATORS 38 (1975). 
95DANIEL MANDELKAR & ROGER CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND 
DEVELOPMENT 1107 (1979). 
96THUROW, et al., supra note 94, at 38; JOHN R. CLARK, COASTAL ECOSYSTEMS 68 (1974). 
97Potomac Sand and Gravel Co. v. Governor of Md., 293 A.2d 241, 249, cert. denied, 408 
U.S. 1040 (1972); Tihansky & Meade, Economic Contribution of Commercial Fisheries in 
Valuing U. S. Estuaries, 2 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 411 (1976).  Although the decision in 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003, has cast a shadow over wetlands regulation, Professor Mandelkar 
remains optimistic: 
Since Lucas, state courts have upheld a designation  of a wetlands and the denial of 
development permits against taking claims.  They have been able to find economic 
uses of the land that avoids the application of the Lucas per se taking rule, even though 
those uses were wetlands and recreation uses. 
MANDELKAR, supra note 78, § 12.04. 
98THUROW, supra note 94, at 40; see CLARK, supra note 95, at 96. 
99Tihansky & Meade, supra note 97. 
100Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and Dev. Comm’n., 89 
Cal. Rptr. 897, 906 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 
1383 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); Potomac Sand and Gravel Co., 293 
A.2d at 241; Lopes v. City of Peabody, 629 N.E.2d  1312, 1316 (Mass. 1994); FIC Homes of 
Blackstone, Inc. v. Conservation Comm’n., 673 N.E.2d 61, 68 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996); Sibson 
v. State, 282 A.2d. 664, 666 (N.H. 1971); Gazza v. New York State Dept. of Envtl. 
Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035, 1040 (N.Y. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 813 (1997); Mills, 
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b.  Primary aquifer recharge areas–Primary aquifer recharge areas consist of 
those land surfaces that serve to recharge an underground water supply.  When 
recharge areas are densely developed, the attendant increase in impervious surface 
area reduces the amount of rainwater seeping into, and recharging, the aquifer.  The 
legal protection of land areas performing this recharge function has been upheld in 
several states.102 Again, the problem seems to lie less with the objective than with the 
accurate definition and delineation of a particular recharge area. 
c.  Agricultural and forest land – Prior to 1980, the preservation of prime 
agricultural land was rarely a generally accepted “stand-alone” objective under the 
police power.103  The sparse case law at that time usually focused on non-exclusive 
agricultural zoning (carried out through requirements of large lots which also allow 
for residential uses).  In the past twenty years, however, many state courts have 
specifically accepted this police power objective and have endorsed significant 
protections based on the objective.104 
By contrast, the preservation of prime forestland remains a rarely endorsed 
objective, and case law is sparse on this topic.105  Given the uncertain treatment of 
the forest preservation objective, I advise the planning staff to proceed very 
cautiously.  The staff should base its regulatory programs on thorough technical 
studies, carefully drafted findings, and extensive consultation with the municipal 
attorney. 
d. Air and water quality—In the 1970’s, the federal government directly 
undertook the protection of air and water quality through enactment of the Clean Air 
Act,106 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.107 
                                                          
Inc. v. Murphy, 352 A.2d 661, 669 (R.I. 1976); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 
768 (Wis. 1972). 
101See notes 177-88, and accompanying text. 
102Moviematic Indus. Corp. v. Bd. of County Comm’r, 349 So. 2d. 667, 669-71 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1977),  New Jersey Builders Ass’n. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 404 A.2d 320, 330-31 
(Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1979); Ketchel v. Bainbridge Township, 557 N.E.2d 779, 782-83 (Ohio 
1990), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 1120 (1991). 
103Rare instances of pre-1980 cases upholding agricultural zoning were in California, 
Consol. Rock Prod. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 370 P.2d 342 (Cal. 1962), appeal dismissed, 
371 U.S. 36 (1962) and Oregon, Joyce v. City of Portland, 546 P.2d 1100 (Or. 1976) 
(upholding against a taking challenge the rezoning of 842 acres from “low density residential” 
to “farm and forest”).  The case law as of 1980 was summarized in John C. Keene, 
Agricultural Land Preservation: Legal and Constitutional Issues, 15 GONZ. L. REV. 621 
(1980). 
104See Von Kerssenbrock–Praschma v. Saunders, 121 F.3d 373, 378 (8th Cir. 1997); 
Harvard State v. County of McHenry, 620 N.E.2d 1360, 1364-68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Wilson 
v. County of McHenry, 416 N.E.2d 426, 428-30 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (upholding 160 acre 
minimum lot sizes);  Smythe v. Butler Township, 620 N.E.2d 901, 905 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993), 
appeal dismissed, 619 N.E.2d 419 (Ohio 1993).  See generally M. W. Cordes, Takings, 
Fairness and Farmland Preservation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1033 (1999). 
105See Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1998). 
10642 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7515 (1994). 
10733 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994). 
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Both the air and water quality programs have as their main statutory 
objective the attainment of statutory air and water quality standards . . . 
There are two sets of standards; primary standards are established to 
protect the public health while secondary standards are established to 
protect the public welfare.108 
Were it not for the protection afforded by these federal statutes, these objectives 
would certainly fall under the health and safety goal of the local policies plan.109  To 
the extent that federal protection is eroded by poor implementation or relaxation of 
standards, local governments may find themselves more actively involved in this 
area. 
3.  Economic Efficiency/Energy Conservation 
Most planners would include the objectives discussed in this section under the 
heading of growth management.  However, growth can be managed for a number of 
reasons, some of them permissible and some exclusionary and illegal (e.g., exclusion 
of lower-income persons).110 By avoiding the use of the “growth management” 
phrase and focusing instead on the legitimate reasons for its application, the ensuing 
discussion can better demonstrate the proper limits of growth management strategies. 
Some definitions are required: 
(Economic) efficiency is associated with public cost implications whether 
in terms of municipal expenditures or cost to the urban dwellers in general 
. . . (Energy conservation) is a special case of cost efficiency in which 
scarcity of energy supply rather than a whole mix of considerations 
becomes the basis of figuring costs.111 
Although few of the cases reference it specifically, a review of the objectives 
discussed in this section will reveal that “economic efficiency” is the core goal 
involved in these cases.  Energy conservation is a newer concern, and this writer is 
                                                                
108MANDELKAR & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 95, at 1154. 
109Localities contemplating regulation of air and water quality must first overcome a 
significant federal preemption hurdle:   
With the advent of increasingly sophisticated federal and state environmental 
regulations and enforcement mechanisms the idea of costly local enforcement of local 
performance standards seems a needless redundancy for both the local government 
and the industrial community.  Legally, such local efforts are, in any event, frequently 
pre-empted by federal and state laws and regulations.   
ROBERT BABCOCK & CLIFFORD WEAVER, CITY ZONING: THE ONCE AND FUTURE FRONTIER 83 
(1979). 
110Consider the warning issued by Professor Norman Williams in 1955:  
There is a difference, sometimes rather subtle but none the less real, between those 
communities which want to grow by admitting only “the right kind of people,” and 
others which do not want to grow at all.  The latter type of community simply does not 
want anybody to move in, because it prefers to maintain its status as a small semi-rural 
or rural village, untouched by “development.”   
Williams, supra note 14, at 348.  See also Kushner, supra note 90, for a thorough review of 
permissible growth management objectives. 
111CHAPIN & KAISER, supra note 66, at 52. 
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aware of no cases validating it as an independent end of regulation.  However, the 
economic impact of energy waste is documented,112 and eventual acceptance by the 
courts is possible. 
a.  Staging growth–Can a municipality stage or “time” growth so as to prevent 
unreasonable increases in land areas for which urban services (e.g., public water, 
sewer, drainage) must be provided?  The courts approving such measures do so with 
qualifications.  The qualifications usually include the presence of a capital 
improvements program, a provision for eventual service (even if 10-20 years in the 
future) of all areas, and a provision allowing developers to advance the approval date 
by installing urban services at their expense.113  Further, the notable growth timing 
schemes upheld by the courts have been adopted in communities experiencing rapid 
population growth.  Accordingly, findings associated with this objective should 
document: (1) the existence of rapid growth in the community; and (2) the fiscal 
impact of this growth on the community. 
b.  Encouraging an efficient pattern of land development–In contrast to the 
timing objective discussed above, this objective seeks to achieve a permanent pattern 
of land development that is more efficient than that which would develop in the 
absence of controls.  Governments pursuing this objective frequently concentrate 
financial resources by “providing services and utilities to limited, prespecified 
areas.”114 
This objective has not received general acceptance by the courts; planners 
attempting to implement water and sewer extension policies by denying services to 
uneconomic areas, have found their schemes struck down by several state courts.115 
                                                                
112See ROBERT STOBAUGH & DANIEL YERGIN, ENERGY FUTURE 55-64 (1979). 
113In upholding Hudson, Ohio’s growth management scheme against a number of constitu-
tional challenges, a federal appellate court stated:  
The City of Hudson wishes to control growth of residential areas until such time as its 
infrastructure is able to meet current and future needs. . . .   Slowing the rate of growth 
will allow the City to improve its infrastructure to meet existing and future needs 
without straining resources.  
Schenck v. City of Hudson, 114 F.3d 590, 594-95 (6th Cir. 1998).  Accord Golden v. Planning 
Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972).  However, several state courts have struck down growth 
control measures that were not properly linked to these permissable objectives.  See, e.g., City 
of Boca Raton v. Bocas Villas Corp., 371 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1974) (voiding city charter 
amendment that set a cap of 40,000 dwelling units); Stoney Brook Dev. Corp. v. Town of 
Fremont, 474 A.2d 561 (N.H. 1984) (finding no careful study of community’s needs and no 
means to insure relaxation of growth controls); Beck v. Town of Raymond, 394 A.2d 847 
(N.H. 1978) (voiding annual ceiling on each londowner’s available building permits—but 
allowing to survive as an interim measure ); Toll Brothers, Inc. v. West Windsor Township, 
712 A.2d 266 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (voiding complex permit allocation formula 
that took too long to ripen); Continental Bldg. Co., Inc. v. Town of North Salem, 211 A.D.2d 
88 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (finding the community set too small of a percentage–1%–of 
community’s residentially-zoned  land available for multi-family development “as of right”). 
114KAISER, et al., supra note 66, at 290; CHAPIN & KAISER, supra note 66, at 52. 
115See, e.g., Robinson v. City of Boulder, 547 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1976), overruled on other 
grounds in  Bd. of City Com’rs v. Denver Bd. of Water Com’rs, 718 P.2d 246 (Colo. 1986) ; 
United Farmworkers of Fla. Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th 
Cir. 1974).  See generally Carol R. Stone, The Prevention of Urban Sprawl through Utility 
Extension Control, 14 URB. LAW. 357, 366-69; 375-77  (1982). 
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Further, the planning profession itself has never agreed on what constitutes an 
economically efficient pattern of land development.116 
Accordingly, until better planning information is available, I advise the planning 
staff to avoid regulatory schemes based solely on this objective.  When that planning 
information becomes available, the staff should then seek the active involvement of 
the municipal attorney in drafting land use controls based on this objective. 
c.  Encouraging economic and energy-efficient site design—The previous 
subsection considered the objective of promoting efficient development patterns for 
the community as a whole.  By contrast, this subsection addresses the more localized 
objective of encouraging and requiring economic and energy-efficient site planning.  
A study of thirteen communities enacting ordinances based on this latter objective 
has identified four major areas of energy use regulation: (1) reducing heating and 
cooling needs; (2) reducing the dependence on automobile transportation; (3) 
reducing the consumption of energy in construction material and processes; and (4) 
promoting the use of alternate energy.117 
Regulations based on these objectives are very new, and few have been litigated 
in the courts.  Note, however, that regulatory actions in this area have concentrated 
on encouraging (and removing regulatory barriers to) energy conserving practices,118 
yet few localities have actually required such practices.119 
d.  Requiring new development to pay a larger percent of public costs of land 
development—Local governments have traditionally required developers to install 
certain types of improvements–streets, utility house connections and laterals, onsite 
drainage–as a condition of subdivision approval.  However, many rapidly growing 
communities have sought to ease municipal finance burdens by requiring developers 
to install, or pay for, other improvements that have traditionally been paid for out of 
general revenues.120 
                                                                
116Cf. Peter Gordon and Harry W. Richardson, Are Compact Cities a Desirable Planning 
Goal, 63 J. AMER. INST. PLANNERS 95 (1997) with Reid Ewing, Is Los Angeles-Style Sprawl 
Desirable?, 63 J. AMER. INST. PLANNERS 107 (1997). 
117Duncan Erley & David Mosena, Energy Conserving Development Regulations: Current 
Practice, AM. PLANNING ASSOC. #352 PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE REPORT 1 (1980). 
118Id. at 33. 
119Id.  
120Street lights, parks, school sites, firehouses, off-site sewerage facilities (all of which 
were once financed from general funds) are now often exacted from developers, and bicycle 
paths and traffic control devices are on the horizon.  Ellickson, supra note 27, at 465.  See, 
e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 711.101 (Baldwin’s 1994) (authorizing cities to require new 
subdivisions to include streets, curbs, gutters, sidewalks, sanitary sewers and storm sewers).  
For a recent summary of state law cases on subdivision exactions (followed by a new “rough 
proportionality” test) see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389-91 (1994).  North 
Carolina will probably use the mid-level “rational nexus” test.  See Batch v. Town of Chapel 
Hill, 376 S.E.2d 22, 31 (1989), rev’d. on other grounds, 387 S.E.2d 655 (N.C. 1990).  Cf. 
River Birch Associates v. City of Raleigh, 388 S. E. 2d 538 (N.C. 1990) (upholding a three 
acre park dedication when the subdivider creates “the specific need” for the park) with  
Buckland v. Town of How River, 541 S.E.2d 497 (N.C. 2000) (striking down town’s attempt 
to require construction of adjacent street).   Ohio used to follow the conservative rule that 
exactions must be “specifically and uniquely attributable” to the project’s impact, see McKain 
v. Toledo City Plan Comm’n., 270 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971), but in Home 
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The early cases from the 1960’s authorized dedications of land for road 
widening,121 recreation areas,122 and school sites.123 By the end of that decade, some 
state courts were upholding regulations authorizing governments to accept cash 
payments in lieu of land allocations.124 In the past thirty years, governments have 
employed progressively extreme measures such as requiring dedications or payments 
for thoroughfares, water and sewerage treatment plants and trunk lines, and major 
offsite drainage improvements.  Although cases upholding each of these 
requirements can be found,125 communities that have traditionally financed such 
services with general tax revenues will encounter serious difficulties in the courts.126 
Accordingly, the planning staff should proceed with extreme caution in this area.  
Regarding parks and school sites, the community should ask the developer to pay 
only that portion of the cost bearing “a rational nexus to the needs created by and 
benefits conferred upon, the subdivision.”127  Through careful drafting of findings 
and policies, staff should develop criteria to aid in this evaluation. 
                                                          
Builders Ass’n. v. City  of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 356 (Ohio 2000) the Ohio Supreme 
Court endorsed a “middle level of scrutiny” in upholding an impact fee for off-site road 
improvements.   See also Connie B. Cooper, Transportation Impact Fees and Excise Taxes, 
AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, #493 PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE 1 (2000). 
121Ayres v. City Council, 207 P. 2d 1 (Cal. 1962); 181 Inc. v. Salem County Planning Bd., 
336 A.2d 501 (N.J. Super. 1975). 
122Jordan v. Vill. of Menomonee Falls, 137 N. W. 2d 442 (Wis. 1965), appeal dismissed, 
385 U.S. 4 (1966).  But cf. Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E. 
2d 799 (Il. 1961) (finding the need for facilities not adequately established in the record). 
123Morris Cmty. High School Dist. No. 101 v. Morris Dev. Co., 320 N.E. 3d 37 (Ill. Ct. 
App. 1974).  See also Ellickson, supra note 27, at 486-87. 
124Associated Homebuilders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Cal. 1970);  
Jenad, Inc. v. Vill. of Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673, (N.Y. 1966); Jordan, supra note 122.  But cf. 
Ellickson, supra note 27, at 483, who noted that local governments lost eight of the twelve 
park exaction cases reported in the decade between 1966-1976. 
125See Associated Homebuilders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 366 P.2d 448 (Cal. 1961) 
(upholding off-site utility charges); Wald Corp. v. Metro Dade County, 338 So.2d 863 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (upholding dedication for canal); Krieger v. Planning Comm., 167 A.2d 
885 (Md. 1961) (upholding dedication for road widening); Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of 
Detroit, 217 N.W. 58 (Mich. 1928) (upholding dedication for road widening); Divan Builders, 
Inc. v. Planning Bd., 334 A.2d 30 (N.J. 1975) (upholding requirement for off-site drainage). 
126McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm’n., 270 N.E.2d 370 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971) 
(invalidating a subdivision requirement to widen a thoroughfare 700 feet distant from 
developer’s project); R. G. Dunbar, Inc. v. Comm’n., 367 N.E.2d 1193 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) 
(stating that city planning commission cannot “freeze” construction based on an uncertain 
street concept for a future highway).  See also Ellickson, supra note 27, at 486. 
127Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 245 A.2d 336, 337 (N.J. 1967)(per curiam), 
discussed in Ellickson, supra note 27, at 482. Accord the “rough proportionality” test 
announced by the U. S. Supreme Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).  
For an example of an ordinance designed to meet the Longridge test, see the discussion of the 
City of Naperville’s ordinance contained in Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 354 N.E.2d 489 
(Ill. Ct. App. 1976) (reviewing and upholding an ordinance providing for land dedications or 
fee exactions under standards based on the estimated final population of the proposed 
subdivision).  See also Wald, 338 So.2d at 863; Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 11 
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In considering dedication requirements or impact fees for other traditionally 
“public” improvements, the planning staff should first confirm the existence of state 
enabling legislation.  Second, the staff should prepare a five-year capital 
improvement program (including projections of federal and state funding at current 
levels) with allowance for facility dedications or impact fees to compensate for 
shortfalls.  Third, the staff should seek governmental adoption of the five-year 
program. 
Upon completion of these initial actions, the staff can then work with the 
municipal attorney to draft an impact fee ordinance.  The ordinance should apply to 
all significant development projects and should specify all needed community 
service facilities.  The ordinance should require construction of off-site facilities (or 
payment of a fee for same) only after the community’s planning commission finds 
that: (1) the development will generate a need for the facility; and (2) the required 
construction or charge is reasonably related to the need generated by the project.  
When the community assesses a specific fee, it should deposit that fee in a 
special account established for the given facility.  The community should spend the 
fee within a reasonable (no more than five years) time period.  Finally, planning staff 
should develop standard formulas to calculate fees and should insure that 
expenditures are confined to pre-designated benefit zones.       
e.  Encouraging development/redevelopment in areas already served by urban 
services–To the extent that future urban development can be encouraged to locate in 
areas already served by urban services (i.e. public water, sewer, drainage, police and 
fire protection), a community minimizes the expenses of utility construction and 
expansion.  Policies directed toward this objective normally speak in terms of 
“promoting infill development.”128 The objective itself is usually acceptable as a 
valid economic measure.129  Additionally, it is usually supplemented with aesthetic 
objectives relating to the revitalization of cities.  The difficulty comes in 
implementing the objective through valid yet effective measures.130 
                                                          
(Minn. 1976); River Birch Associates v. City of Raleigh, 388 S.E.2d 538 (N.C. 1990) 
(upholding required dedication of three acres–out of a 19.6 acre townhouse development—for 
a private homeowners association’s recreational use). Ellickson would probably further 
qualify the Longridge test by insisting that the exaction also be consistent with the manner in 
which the community has traditionally financed the specific services.  Ellickson, supra note 
27, at 483. 
128As early as 1635, a Massachusetts court ordered that court permission was required 
prior to building a dwelling more than one-half mile from the meeting house in any town.  
Hart, supra note 77, at 1273.  See generally J. Terrance Farris, The Barriers to Using Urban 
Growth Infill Development to Achieve Smart Growth, 12 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 1 (2001).  
Portland, Oregon and Minneapolis–St. Paul are generally regarded as national leaders in the 
promotion of infill development.  Portland has focused on regional growth management 
regulatory tools to discourage exurban development, while Minneapolis- St. Paul has focused 
on both regulations and regional tax sharing.  Cf. Carl Abbott, The Portland Region: Where 
City and Suburbs Talk to Each Other—and Often Agree, 8 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 11 
(1997), with Freilich & Ragsdale, supra note 22. 
129Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 33 (1954). 
130For a discussion of this “infill” objective and the problem of structuring programs to 
achieve it, see  AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, supra note 19, at 201-202; BABCOCK & 
WEAVER, supra note 109, at 281-294.  See generally Peter A. Buchsbaum, Old Wine in New 
Bottles: Redevelopment Tales of a City, a Suburb and a State, 30 URB. LAW. 745 (1998). 
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4.  Aesthetics 
Although conservative concepts of zoning authority have always regarded 
“aesthetics” or “amenity” as insufficient bases for police power regulations, these 
factors often lie at the core of significant zoning classifications.  Some commentators 
see a trend toward judicial acceptance of aesthetics matters as proper objectives; 
others see only a more open discussion of these factors (in place of prior judicial 
manipulations which based decisions on tenuous health and safety grounds).131  
While there are differences in the degree to which state courts will accept aesthetics 
ends as independent bases for regulations, it does seem clear that courts will readily 
uphold ordinances that also promote economic ends.132 
a.  Protecting the stability of residential neighborhoods–Few purposes of land 
use control have received more consistent judicial support than the promotion of 
peace and stability in detached residential neighborhoods.  The following dictum 
from the Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty opinion set the stage: 
With particular reference to apartment houses, it is pointed out that the 
development of detached house sections is greatly retarded by the coming 
of apartment houses . . . Under these circumstances, apartment houses, 
which in a different environment would be not only entirely 
unobjectionable but highly desirable, come near to being nuisances.133 
The state courts have readily accepted single-family zoning as a proper pursuit of 
this objective; moreover, in 1973, the Supreme Court itself supplied additional 
encouragement.134  Accordingly, virtually no court will question a community’s right 
                                                                
131Consider the following quotation from a 1913 Missouri case sustaining billboard 
regulations: 
The evidence also shows that behind the obstructions the lowest form of prostitution 
and other acts of immorality are frequently carried on, almost under public gaze; they 
offer shelter and concealment for the criminal while lying in wait for victim; and last, 
but not least, they obstruct the light, sunshine and air, which are so conducive to health 
and comfort. 
St. Louis Gunning Adver. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 137 S.W. 929, 942 (Mo. 1913).  For a 
classic discussion of the reasoning in the early aesthetics zoning cases, see J. J. Dukeminier, 
Jr.,  Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 218 (1955). 
132In the 1980s, both North Carolina and Ohio rendered favorable decisions on “aesthetics 
zoning.”  State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675 (N.C. 1982); Franchise Developers, Inc. v. City of 
Cincinnati, 505 N.E.2d 966 (Ohio 1987); Vill. of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 458 N.E.2d 852 
(Ohio 1984), cert. denied 467 U. S. 1237 (1984).  In a survey undertaken prior to these 
decisions, a commentator observed that sixteen states accepted aesthetics as a legitimate police 
power objective and nine states did not.  Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: A New 
Majority of Jurisdictions Authorize Aesthetic Regulation, 48 UMKC L. REV. 125, 127 (1980). 
133Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926). 
134In Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1973), the U. S. Supreme Court upheld a 
village’s establishment of an exclusive single-family zone against numerous constitutional 
challenges.  The court issued the following dictum:   
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are 
legitimate guidelines in a land use project addressed to family needs. . . .  The police 
power . . . is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the 
blessings of quiet seclusion and clear air make the area a sanctuary for people.  
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to set aside protected detached residential areas; difficulties will only arise when 
attempts are made to classify all, or nearly all, of a jurisdiction’s residential lands for 
such use.135  
b.  Historic and scenic areas–The regulation of unique historic and scenic areas 
to preserve the aesthetic features of such areas is a valid police power objective in 
some states.136 Such regulations are supported by the so-called “aesthetic-economic 
rationale,” which holds that scenic or historic areas that attract large numbers of 
tourists are deserving of protection due to economic as well as aesthetic reasons.137 
Additionally, as high technology employers increasingly target “amenity” as a key 
location factor, unique historic areas can be protected under a “job attraction” 
economic rationale.138 
c.  General design and appearance–Regulation of the design and appearance of 
buildings in typical (although usually expensive) residential and commercial areas 
                                                          
Id. at 9. 
135See S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, appeal 
dismissed, cert. denied, 423 U. S. 808 (1975); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 
236 (N.Y. 1975). 
136North Carolina embraced the “historic preservation” objective in A-S-P Associates v. 
City of Raleigh, 258 S.E.2d 444 (N.C. 1979).  To date, Ohio courts have sidestepped the 
question of whether historic preservation, standing alone, constitutes an acceptable police 
power objective.  See, e.g., State ex. rel. BSW Dev. v. Dayton, 699 N.E.2d 1271 (Ohio 1999), 
cert. denied, 526 U. S. 1067 (1999).  See generally R. Netherton, The Due Process Issues in 
Zoning for Historic Preservation, 19 URB. LAW. 77 (1987). 
137See, e.g., Bohannon v. City of San Diego, 106 Cal. Rptr. 333 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973); 
Sunad, Inc.  v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960); City of New Orleans v. 
Pergament, 5 So. 2d 129 (La. 1941); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 563 
(Mass. 1955); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, 389 P.2d 13 (N.M. 1964); Hayes v. Smith, 
167 A.2d 546 (R.I. 1961). See generally MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 2-209 (1976) and 
accompanying note. 
138In a recent economic analysis, three University of North Carolina professors stated:  
Studies of the locational preferences of high-technology firms in the Southeast have 
found that the livability and education factors were the most important criteria, 
followed by local transportation and infrastructure availability (Malizia, 1985).  
Raleigh-Durham is consistently rated by business magazines as one of the best places 
in the United States to live and work.  The concentration of research universities and 
research-based industries in Research Triangle Park has drawn a significant number of 
achievement-oriented people, reflected in the fact that the area contains the highest per 
capita concentration of Ph. D.’s in the United States.  
Dennis A. Randinelli, et al., James, The Changing Focus of Urban Economic Development: 
Globalization and City Competitiveness in the 21st Century, 3 CITYSCAPE: A JOURNAL OF 
POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH 89 (No. 3) (1998), citing Emil Malizia, The Locational 
Attractiveness of the Southeast to High Technology Manufacturers, in HIGH HOPES FOR HIGH 
TECHNOLOGY (Dale Whittington, ed. 1985).  In a recent discussion of the relationship between 
“amenity” and economics, Partners for Livable Communities stated: “We urged cities to 
incorporate cultural facilities, parks and open space, natural and scenic resources, 
architecturally distinct buildings, and preserved or restored historic areas in their planning for 
economic development.” PARTNERS FOR LIVABLE COMMUNITIES, THE LIVABLE CITY: 
REVITALIZING URBAN COMMUNITIES 9 (2000).  See generally R. MCNULTY, ET AL., THE 
ECONOMICS OF AMENITY:   COMMUNITY FUTURES AND QUALITY OF LIFE (1985). 
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may represent the most extreme intrusion of government into the amorphous area of 
“beauty.” Nevertheless, courts occasionally uphold such regulations, particularly 
when strong ties between design and neighborhood property values can be 
established.139  Naturally, technical planning foundations and legal precision are 
again crucial factors in the defensibility of such programs. 
d.  Maintaining a rural residential lifestyle–The first aesthetics objective 
discussed above was “preserving the stability of residential neighborhoods.” A 
closely related yet separate objective is “maintaining a rural residential lifestyle.”  
The difference between the objectives lies in the latter’s “rural” emphasis that speaks 
to the dominant visual impression of open space rather than structures.140 A number 
of state courts have approvingly cited this objective while upholding large lot zoning 
schemes.141 However, the presence of other permissible objectives for large lot 
zoning in most of these cases makes it difficult to assess the independent standing of 
the specific aesthetic purpose.142 
A carefully crafted and geographically limited regulatory scheme based on this 
objective will probably succeed in most courts.  However, staff should expect serious 
problems when it seeks to devote all of its residential areas to low-density living.143 
Relatively few rural communities–those with virtually no commercial or industrial 
development, no public service or facilities, and no low-income residents–can hope 
to succeed in allocating most of their lands to rural residential use.144 
5.  Economic Development 
Prior to the 1970’s, most planning offices gave little attention to the goal of 
economic development.  However, as the local economies in many major cities 
continued to deteriorate, more planners instituted local economic development 
planning. 
                                                                
139People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272 (N.Y. 1963) (upholding ordinance prohibiting the 
stringing of clotheslines in front yards), appeal dismissed, 375 U. S. 42 (1963); Reid v. 
Architectural Bd. of Review, 192 N.E.2d 74 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) (upholding architectural 
board of review’s denial of permit for home clashing with general neighborhood design in a 
fashionable (but not historically unique) suburb). 
140MANDELKAR & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 95, at 430.  An Ohio appellate court 
recognized the validity of protecting a small town environment in Loretto Dev. Co, Inc. v. 
Vill. of Chardon, 695 N.E.2d 1151 (Ohio 1996).  Accord B.P. Am., Inc. v. Avon City Council, 
753 N.E.2d 947 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). 
141Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980);  Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos 
Hills, 370 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff’d, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974); Senior v. Zoning 
Comm’n, 153 A.2d 415 (Conn. 1959), appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 143 (1960); Norbeck Vill. 
Joint Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 254 A.2d 700 (Md. App. 1969); Simon v. 
Needham, 42 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1943). 
142For lists of objectives frequently used to support large lot zoning, see BEUSCHER & 
WRIGHT, supra note 11, at 485-86 and MANDELKAR & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 95, at 430-
31. 
143See cases cited at supra notes 113 and 135. 
144See Ybarra, 370 F. Supp. at 746, 750-51. 
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Local economic development planning is a central feature of the planning 
process today, just as the segregation of land uses was for an earlier era.  
The new goal of economic development planning–to increase the number 
and variety of job opportunities available to local residents—requires that 
local governments and community groups use local resources to design 
and develop the local economy.145 
In short, the economic development goal reflects the public interest in a healthy and 
diversified local economy.  Because planners have only recently promoted this goal, 
few courts have ruled on its validity. Further, the nature of the goal is such that 
regulatory responses are frequently inappropriate; deregulation and public spending 
programs are often better strategies in ailing urban areas.146 
a.  Protecting the local economic base–The objective of protecting the local 
economic base often arises as a side issue in cases involving wetlands protection and 
the protection of scenic or historic areas.147  In these cases, discussion of the need to 
protect the local economy occurs often.  Questions remain as to the validity of 
regulatory measures designed solely to protect an area’s economy, but this is an area 
where planning background studies can convince the courts of the legitimacy of the 
objective. 
b.  Preserving/improving the central business district–Regulations based on the 
need to protect and enhance a community’s central business district have 
occasionally received favorable judicial treatment.148  Commenting on a New Jersey 
borough’s refusal to rezone outlying areas for shopping center use, a New Jersey 
court concluded that the intention to preserve the central business district was the 
only possible objective behind the ordinance; nevertheless, the court upheld the 
borough’s action.149  Other courts are now beginning to accept this reasoning.150 
c.  Encouraging new industrial development–Apart from the objective of 
protecting the existing economic base, a community can actively seek to attract new 
industrial development.  This is seldom discussed as a police power objective, 
primarily because police power responses to the problem are rarely appropriate.  
Instead, deregulation and technical assistance strategies are usually employed. 
                                                                
145EDWARD J. BLAKELY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, in INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGEMENT 
ASSOCIATION, THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING 286 (2000). 
146See BABCOCK & WEAVER, supra note 109 at 81-82 (maintaining industrial economic 
base) and 295-298 (supporting some deregulation in central business districts).  Baltimore 
followed this approach in the early 1970s.  See AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, supra note 
23, at 20, 63-64. 
147See cases cited supra notes 97 and 137. 
148Forte v. Borough of Tenafly, 255 A.2d 804 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1969). 
149Id. at 806-07. 
150Jacobs Visconsi & Jacobs v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1120 (10th Cir. 1991); 
Oberndorf v. Denver, 900 F.2d 1434, 1441 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 845 
(1990); Boone v. Redevelopment Agency of San Jose, 841 F.2d 886, 892 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 488 U. S. 965 (1988).  But cf. Westborough Mall Inc. v. Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 
(8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U. S. 945 (1983). See generally Clifford L. Weaver and 
Christopher J. Duerkson, Central District Planning and the Control of Outlying Shopping 
Centers, 14 URBAN LAW ANNUAL 57 (1977). 
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6.  Community Development 
If asked to define a “community development” goal, many communities would 
simply equate it to the programs funded under the federal community development 
block grant program.  Under a different heading (“Equity”), the authors of an urban 
planning text identified a much broader goal: it involves “fundamental human rights” 
and includes both social equity and social choice objectives.151 
a.  Achieving social equity—Social equity encompasses the civil rights of the 
community’s populace, particularly insofar as those rights intersect (or should 
intersect) with the local government’s land use and public improvement programs: 
Social equity includes not only equal access to education, recreation, and 
other services provided by tax funds for the general welfare, but also 
equal opportunity to be employed, to lease or acquire property, and to be 
served in the businesses (restaurants, hotels, theaters, etc.) without regard 
to race, religion, or social status, including the right to travel or to move 
into a community.152 
b.  Increasing choices for those constituents who have the fewest choices— This 
goal has its roots in the “advocacy planning” concept articulated by planners Paul 
Davidoff and Thomas Reiner in a 1962 article.153  The advocacy planning approach 
was implemented by Professor Norman Krumholz during his tenure as Cleveland 
planning director in 1969-1979.  As articulated by Professor Krumholz: 
Our approach, we decided, would be based on one overriding goal: that, in 
a context of limited resources, we must place first priority on the task of 
promoting more choices for those Cleveland residents who had few, if 
any, choices.  We were not aiming at more choices for all, but more 
choices for those who had few.154 
In practice, the proponents of these objectives have used the city spending and 
taxation powers (as opposed to regulatory powers) as their primary tools. 
c.  Enhancing constituents’ self-determination—Some may contend that the 
pursuit of self-determinism is a means to an end, rather than an independent 
objective.  However, in many cities, decision-making at the block and neighborhood 
level is an independent–and a strongly accepted–local objective.155  Again, this 
                                                                
151CHAPIN & KAISER, supra note 66, at 54-55. 
152Id. at 55. 
153Paul Davidoff & Thomas A. Reiner, A Choice Theory of Planning, 28 J. AM. INST. 
PLANNERS 103 (1962). 
154NORMAN KRUMHOLZ, Government, Equity, Redistribution, and the Practice of Urban 
Planning, CLEVELAND: A METROPOLITAN READER 312 (W. Dennis Keating, et al eds., 1995).  
The U.S. Supreme Court has arguably endorsed this objective in a unanimous decision 
upholding Hawaii’s use of eminent domain to disperse land ownership and create fee estates 
for former tenants.  See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
155See generally Judith A. Martin & Paula R. Pentel, What the Neighbors Want:  The 
Neighborhood Revitalization Program’s First Decade, 68 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 435 (2002). 
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objective is usually implemented through spending powers rather than regulatory 
powers.156   
D.  Land Classification Map and Short Term Public Action Program 
for the Policies Plan 
The public goals and police power objectives described in Section II(C) above 
comprise the raw materials for the community’s five-year policies plan.  The 
planning staff must then incorporate these goals and objectives into two operational 
documents: a land classification map and a short-term public action program. 
1.  Land Classification Map 
The purpose of the land classification map is to graphically represent the 
consequences of the goals, police power objectives, findings and policies.  The map 
should divide the community’s total land area into four major categories of land use: 
“developed,” “transition,” “rural,” and “conservation.”157 
The “developed” category should coincide with the existing pattern of intense 
urban development.  The “transition” category should indicate the areas where 
intense urban development (or redevelopment) is anticipated—and is appropriate—
during the next five years.   
The “rural” category may represent either of two distinct concepts.  A “pure 
rural” category indicates those portions of the community where preservation of a 
low-density, rural environment is desirable for a long-term (20-25 year) period.  By 
contrast, a “rural holding area” indicates areas where intense urban development is 
not expected within five years, but may occur soon thereafter. 
The “conservation” category encompasses those environmentally sensitive areas 
(or neighborhoods) where additional development activity of almost any kind will 
destroy significant natural or historic resources.  
2.  Short-Term Public Action Program 
This short-term public action program is gradually becoming an accepted 
element in the comprehensive planning process.158  Its functions are detailed in the 
American Law Institute’s [hereinafter “ALI”] Model Land Development Code: 
First, it demands that planners devote major attention to accomplishment 
of desired objectives rather than simply to formulating them. Second, it 
gives meaning to the objectives by detailing their costs and consequences.  
Third, it makes the plan more realistic because the programming time is 
                                                                
156Id. 
157This four-part classification is based on the standards required to be adopted by the 
North Carolina Land Policy Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-156 (West’s 1999). 
158The American Law Institute’s Model Land Development Code requires the local 
planning office to prepare a short-term program of specific public actions to be undertaken.  
MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 3-105 (1975).  In North Carolina, coastal counties preparing 
mandated land use plans under that state’s Coastal Area Management Act must incorporate 
into their plans a list of “implementation actions.”  N.C. ADMIN. CODE TIT. 15A, § 7B-.0214 
(July, 2001). 
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short enough to be comprehended and action is more likely to flow from 
the plan’s adoption by the governing body.159 
A recent planning textbook adds the following: 
Regardless of how well plans are related to goals, the land planning 
program and the community will fail to achieve their potentials unless 
regulations and public investments follow plans.  It is important to attend 
to each function of the planning program and to each link in the planning 
chain, from goals and problems right through to the administration and 
enforcement of regulations.160 
Accordingly, in the short-term public action program, the long-range planning 
staff pursues the general coordination of a range of action instruments.  By contrast, 
the “current planning” staff will perform the specific administrative actions and 
ordinance drafting.  Additionally, both sections of the planning staff should consider 
alternate implementation schedules; methods for evaluating the consequences of 
different programs are available.161 
E.  Summary:  The Functions of Long-Range Planning 
The major function of the long-range planning division is to produce, and 
continually update and revise, a five-year policies plan (including a land 
classification map and a short-term public action program.)  These functions reflect 
the new emphasis on planning as a continuing process, rather than one that ends with 
the preparation of a future land use map. 
The staff should follow the American Law Institute’s approach to the planning 
“process;” the Institute requires that staff submit to the local governing body periodic 
“Land Development Reports.”162  The reports should indicate the extent to which 
plan objectives have been achieved by the previous short-term public action 
program, and indicate the extent to which there have been significant changes in the 
Plan’s technical base.  The reports should also recommend changes in objectives and 
policies, and propose periodic revisions in the short-term public action program.163 
III.  IMPLEMENTING THE PLAN: ORDINANCES AND MAPS 
This section discusses two major planning activities: a) devising specific 
ordinances and investment practices to achieve the directives of the policies plan; 
                                                                
159MODEL LAND DEV. CODE, supra note 158. 
160KAISER, et al., supra note 66, at 82. 
161Chapin and Kaiser recommend that guidance system designs be continuously tested 
against both land use objectives and the real-life development market.  CHAPIN & KAISER, 
supra note 66, at 484, 486.  They discuss a number of land use models suitable for performing 
these evaluations.  Id. at 512-601.  For a procedure to monitor the impact of regulations on 
land costs for housing, see David E. Dowall, Reducing the Cost Effects of Local Land Use 
controls, 47 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 145 (1981). 
162MODEL LAND DEV. CODE, supra note 158, at § 3-107. 
163Id. 
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and b) applying these regulations and investment practices to particular parcels 
through mapping.  
These activities lie at the heart of the planning process; they form a bridge 
between the empirical, normative long-range planning function and the hard realities 
and political choices encountered by the current planning section.  Consequently, it 
is essential that the long range and current planning sections of the planning office 
jointly discuss and decide on the implementation actions discussed here. 
A.  Enacting Specific Action Instruments 
Ordinances, Investments, and Technical Assistance Programs.  The planning 
staff has many available action instruments to implement its plan: these include 
zoning ordinances, subdivision regulations, five-year capital improvements 
programs, and impact fee ordinances.  This section recommends specific office 
procedures to be followed whenever the planning staff considers a particular action 
instrument affecting private land development rights. 
As previously noted, the implementation phase of planning and the second prong 
of the Substantive Due Process test focus on the same general inquiry:  whether a 
particular land use control is reasonably related to a permissible planning objective.  
However, this Article’s model sets a more selective approach than that applied by 
most courts.  In each case, the model proposes that planning staff search for the least 
restrictive regulatory alternative–the control that is no more restrictive of uses than is 
necessary to achieve the relevant objectives.164 
The procedure for analyzing a proposed action consists of four steps: list relevant 
objectives, assess the strength of the relevant objective(s), insure that the action is the 
least restrictive alternative, and make the “decision.”165 
                                                                
164This “least restrictive regulatory alternative” test, while applied in several non-zoning 
subject areas (cf. the fourth prong of the four-part First Amendment test stated in Cen. Hudson 
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 447 U. S. 557, 563-566 (1980), and the antitrust 
“rule of reason” summarized in SUSMAN & WHITE, supra note 59) is a more severe standard 
than most courts would use in their review of land use regulations.  See supra notes 35-50, and 
accompanying text.  However, at least in the area of subdivision exactions, the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), arguably achieves a more 
intense scrutiny of development exactions:  “No precise mathematical calculation is required, 
but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication 
is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”  Id. at 391.  
Additionally, consider the following advice from a Dallas land use attorney: 
Municipalities traditionally have had the advantage as the defendants in land use cases 
. . . over the years, however, these advantages are diminishing.  For instance, in recent 
years, state legislative action has contracted or restricted the scope of municipal police 
powers.  In addition, substantive theories of relief in land use cases have expanded.  At 
the same time, defenses available to municipalities have been limited or restricted.  
Consequently, the result is an increased exposure to substantial damages awards 
arising from implementation of land use regulations. 
MORGAN, supra note 6, § 9.01[1].  Finally, by choosing an admittedly tight standard of 
ordinance review prior to adoption, this article is endorsing a risk-management approach that 
should effectively serve the community in the future. 
165The American Law Institute established a roughly analogous process entitled 
“Statements of Trends, Objectives, Beliefs, Policies and Standards.”  See MODEL LAND DEV. 
CODE, supra note 158, at § 3-104. 
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1.  List Relevant Objectives 
The planning staff should review permissable governmental objectives 
categorized in the policies plan; then it should identify each objective which would 
be served by the adoption of the proposed action.  The advantage of organizing 
policies under categories of objectives approved by the courts becomes apparent at 
this stage, for the planning staff following this procedure is anticipating the approach 
to be taken by a reviewing court. 
2.  Assess the Strength of the Relevant Objectives 
After it has identified the objectives served by the proposed action, the planning 
staff must next gauge the strength of the objective or combined objectives.  As I 
discussed each objective in Section II(C) above, I offered a general assessment of its 
relative strength.  Based on those assessments, the planning staff must then 
determine whether the objective (or combination of objectives) supplies sufficient 
support for the considered action.  If the staff doubts the strength of the supporting 
objectives, the staff should consider whether further studies might sufficiently 
strengthen the foundation of the action.  The municipal attorney’s advice and counsel 
becomes critical at this stage. 
3.  Insure that the Action is the Least Restrictive Alternative 
Assuming there is a reasonable relationship between a proposed action and one 
or more acceptable police power objectives, the planning staff should next ask: Is 
there a less restrictive means of accomplishing the objective(s)?  The planning staff 
can simplify this difficult question by classifying possible actions according to the 
degree to which they appear to interfere with the private land market. 
This subsection identifies seven categories of actions listed in ascending degrees 
of interference with the private market. The staff will answer the “least restrictive 
question” by first classifying the proposed action into one of these seven categories, 
and then examining less severe categories of actions to determine whether they 
might instead be employed to achieve the underlying objectives. 
a.  Marketing, technical assistance and deregulation—These proactive actions 
have the least negative impact on market conditions because they assist, rather than 
regulate developers and redevelopers.  These actions form the core of redevelopment 
strategies for older Rustbelt cities and their inner ring suburbs.166 These urban areas 
                                                                
166The inner ring suburbs in Cleveland, Ohio have formed an effective coalition.  See John 
C. Bruening, Withering Heights: As suburban expansion explodes beyond the county borders, 
the inner ring fights back, CLEVELAND FREE TIMES, June 23-29, 1999, at 16; Thomas Ott, First 
Suburbs Hope to Unite Development Efforts in Council, THE PLAIN DEALER, December 18, 
2001, at 3-J.  Cooperative efforts such as this stand out in northeast Ohio, which often engages 
in intramural sparring.  After travelling to North Carolina’s Research Triangle Park, the 
Chancellor of the Ohio Board of Regents observed:   
Unlike North Carolina, Ohio doesn’t work together.  Our many Ohios, our jealously 
independent city-states, don’t cooperate with one another.  Our colleges and 
universities don’t work together.  Our elected leaders don’t work together. . . .  The 
colleges and universities have defined competition as competition among themselves, 
in an Ohio environment, in a small league.   
Roderick Chu, We Have Met the Enemy and They Is Us, CLEVELAND’S PATH TO REGIONAL 
ADVANTAGE 15 (Case Western Reserve University, ed. 1999). 
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do have marketable attributes: “strategic location, local market demand, integration 
with regional clusters, and human resources.”167 An effective marketing program can 
convey these attributes to both businesses and potential homebuyers. These 
communities can also attract developers through technical assistance and 
deregulation (e.g., simplifying development regulations, replacing discretionary 
review with predetermined standards, encouraging pre-application conferences, and 
using technology to make city hall more accessible). 
b.  Selective spending and taxation (targeting)–Assuming a given level of public 
expenditures and income, a governing body may nevertheless be able to achieve 
certain objectives by targeting its expenditures or tax assessments to selected 
neighborhoods or regions.  By definition, a targeting strategy restricts the class of 
beneficiaries of a spending program.  Rather than spreading public capital 
improvements equally throughout a planning region, the government concentrates its 
spending in certain priority areas.168  Similarly, preferential tax assessment confers 
tax benefits upon a restricted group.169  Obviously, the planning staff must carefully 
craft any targeting strategies. The staff should select priority areas through use of 
criteria designed to yield clear benefits to the public at large; otherwise, the scheme 
can be attacked as an inequitable distribution of governmental services.170 
                                                                
167Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantages of the Inner City, HARV. BUS. REV., 
May-June 1995, at 55. 
168See Duckworth v. City of Kansas City, 758 P.2d 201 (Kan. 1988) (finding no denial of 
equal protection to competing developers when city loaned to developer at 8% interest with 
deferrals); accord Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 626 n.1 (N.C. 1996); 
Stark County v. Ferguson, 440 N.E.2d 816 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).  But see generally Rachel 
Weber, Why Local Economic Development Incentives Don’t Create Jobs: The Role of 
Corporate Governance, 32 URB. LAW. 97 (2000). 
169See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997) (upholding, against an 
equal protection challege, an Ohio tax approach that exempted local distribution companies 
from sales and use taxes on sales of natural gas); Deseno, Inc. v. City of Akron, 706 N.E.2d 
323 (Ohio 1999) (upholding Ohio statute authorizing joint economic development districts); 
McCormack v. Attorney General of Texas, 822 S.W.2d 814 (Tex, App. 1992) (upholding open 
space exemption provision in tax code providing reduced appraisal for land devoted 
principally to agricultural use for five of preceding seven years).  See generally Peter D. 
Enrich, Saving the States From Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints On State Tax 
Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1996); Thomas A. Gihring, Incentive 
Property Taxation: A Potential Tool for Urban Growth Management, 65 J. AM. INST. 
PLANNERS 62 (1999). 
170See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (invalidating village’s demand 
for a 33-foot easement–from property owner who had previously successfully sued the city—
when record showed that city had only asked for 15-foot easements from other property 
owners).  Cf. Mlikotin v. City of Los Angeles, 643 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejecting an equal 
protection challenge to city’s provision of municipal services) with Franklin v. City of Marks, 
439 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding denial of equal protection when city provided inadequate 
services to residents on “other side of tracks”); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 511 F. Supp. 1375 
(M.D. Fla. 1981) (finding denial of equal protection due to deficiencies in city’s provision of 
paving, street maintenance, storm water drainage, and water distribution) modified, 698 F.2d 
1181 (11th Cir. 1983);  Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978) 
(finding deficiencies in city’s provision of street paving, parks, recreation and water supply).  
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c.  Pricing policies–The governing body can adopt various pricing policies that 
impose extra costs on land developers.  These extra costs may consist of 
improvement requirements171 or connection fees to public utilities that use marginal 
cost pricing to encourage efficient development.172 
d.  Traditional zoning–The typical zoning ordinance classifies land. Invariably, 
the classification of a parcel excludes some form of potential development; 
frequently, the property’s “highest and best use” in the market sense cannot be 
attained.  Nevertheless, the property owner is usually left with permitted 
development options that allow for a reasonable economic return. 
e.  Prohibiting most development options for a specified time period—Moratoria 
and staged growth ordinances are examples of actions that focus on the timing of 
development.  Using such measures, a community will seek to ban most or all 
development options for a parcel for a stated time period.173  
f.  Prohibiting nearly all development options–Regulatory programs that attempt 
to restrict development in general (rather than prohibit particular types of 
development) are primarily responses to the need to protect critical environmental 
areas.  The police power objectives required to support such  programs must be 
exceedingly strong.174 
g.  Public land acquisition–The public acquisition of land over a property 
owner’s objections under the power of eminent domain represents the most drastic 
interference with private property rights.175  Additionally, it is the most costly 
                                                          
“In general, a utility must provide service without discrimination to all customers within its 
service area.”  AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, supra note 19 at 56. 
171See supra notes 120-27, and accompanying text. 
172See TABORS, supra note 22, at 126-127; Downing, Sewer and Water Pricing and 
Investment Policies to Implement Urban Growth Policy, 11 WATER RESOURCES BULLETIN 345 
(1975). 
173The U.S. Supreme Court recently affirmed the 9th Circuit’s approval of a 32-month 
moratorium to allow time for lake basin planning.  Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).  Meanwhile, staged growth ordinances have 
received mixed results.  See cases cited supra note 113. 
174See Lucas v. S.C. Carol. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-15 (1992).  In the 6th 
Circuit, see Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 988 F. Supp. 1055, 1064-65 (W.D. Mich. 1997) 
(finding a motorboat restriction applicable to plaintiff’s lake property constituted a taking); 
Tandy Corp. v. City of Livonia, 81 F. Supp. 2d 800 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (finding that city’s 
downzoning of property from commercial to professional use violated substantive due process 
but did not constitute a taking).  In Ohio, see State ex. rel. RTG, Inc. v. State of Ohio, 2002 
Ohio LEXIS 3064 (Ohio 2002) (upholding lower court finding of a taking of subsurface rights 
when regulations prohibited mining in areas near village wells, and then finding an additional 
taking of surface rights). 
175
“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not 
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.  As long recognized, 
some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power.  But 
obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses 
are gone.  One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution.  
When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most or not all cases there must be an exercise of 
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.”  Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 
393, 413 (1922). 
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implementation action for the municipality.176  Consequently, a city should only take 
this action when no other remedy exists for a problem. 
4.  Decision and Preparation of Legislative Findings 
The planning staff’s procession through the first three steps will result in a 
decision concerning the particular spending, taxing, or regulatory action proposed.   
If the proposed action requires legislative authorization, the staff should work with 
the municipal attorney to prepare legislative findings based on the above-described 
analyses. 
B.  Mapping:  Application of Regulations to Specific Parcels 
Land use regulations, capital improvements programs and taxation policies 
establish the ground rules for a community’s future development.  Although the rules 
themselves may occasionally spark controversy, the “acid test” for a regulatory 
program does not take place until the rules are applied to specific parcels of property.  
Concepts that seem remote and esoteric when discussed in the abstract seem to 
acquire a particular vitality when established as mapped zones. 
There is nothing new in the warning that an ordinance valid on its face may 
nonetheless be held to be confiscatory as applied to a specific parcel.177 In fact, 
experienced zoning attorneys will usually concentrate their attacks on the application 
of the ordinance, rather than its underlying constitutional soundness.178  Accordingly, 
there is no more certain invitation to continuous (and often successful) land use 
litigation against a community than a poorly conceived mapping strategy.  Although 
the task of carefully fitting mapped zones to the text of ordinances is often more art 
than science, this section reviews the major contentions usually contained in an 
attack upon an ordinance as applied. 
1.  Mapping of Specific Parcels Must Be Reasonably Related to Valid  
Police Power Objectives 
Substantive Due Process challenges to zoning ordinances are quite common; 
probably because there are at least two ways a community can err in attempting to 
achieve an admittedly valid objective.  First, as discussed in Section III (A) above, 
the regulatory measure itself may not be reasonably related to a valid objective.179 
Second, the application of the measure as expressed in the zoning of a specific parcel 
may be found to be arbitrary.180 
                                                                
176Id. 
177Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928). 
178Corwin W. Johnson, Consitutional Law and Community Planning, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 199, 206, 215 (1955). 
179See cases cited supra note 42. 
180Tuggle v. Manning, 159 S.E.2d 703 (Ga. 1968) (holding that single family zoning 
prohibited only use for which property was reasonably suited); Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. 
Koehler, 194 N.E.2d 49 (Ind. 1963) (finding city’s prohibition of shopping center not based on 
reality, since property was located in large and growing commercial sector); Kozenick v. 
Township of  New Jersey, 131 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1959) (declaring industrial zoning invalid as 
applied to a small parcel that could not be used in that fashion); Rose v. Guilford County, 298 
S.E.2d 200 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (finding rezoning to be illegal due to county’s reliance on 
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Generally, mapping decisions will run afoul of this second requirement when 
specific properties are zoned for uses that they cannot physically accommodate.181 
Ideally, planning staff would consider the suitability of the zoning for each parcel 
before the ordinance is enacted; practically, this is usually impossible. Instead, 
planning staff should consistently refer to the policies plan while mapping decisions 
are made.  Moreover, the community can usually rely on individual property owners 
to point out the worst mapping mistakes by requesting zone changes.  In the context 
of its decisions on zone changes, the community has the opportunity to correct its 
earlier mapping errors.182 
2.  General Mapping Classifications Must Be Reasonably Related to  
Valid Objectives 
The Equal Protection Clause requires that classifications of areas be reasonably 
related to proper police power objectives.  This potential challenge must be 
considered when establishing boundary lines between districts.  While all boundaries 
are arbitrary to some extent, the planner can minimize problems by following some 
general rules. 
a.  Boundaries between urban zones–Planning law authority Philip Green 
recommended two principles for setting boundaries of urban zones.  First, the 
boundaries of a district should be generally run through a block (along rear lot lines) 
rather than down the center of a street.183  Second, when a district line runs parallel to 
side lot lines, the boundary should follow the lot line rather than splitting the lots.184 
b.  Boundaries of environmental areas–Environmental classifications should be 
tied as closely as possible to the underlying natural characteristics that serve as the 
basis for regulations. Accordingly, the mapping of environmental zones is highly 
dependent on the environmental technical studies conducted prior to the preparation 
of the policies plan.185  The planning staff must convey the “equal protection” 
mandates at the mapping stage to those persons responsible for technical studies.  
The technical studies must supply sufficient criteria to enable the mapper to logically 
                                                          
neighbors’ complaints rather than property’s suitability for the particular zoning category); 
Shemo v. Mayfield Heights, 722 N.E.2d 1018 (Ohio 2000), reconsideration denied, 727 
N.E.2d 596 (Ohio 2000) (holding a cluster single-family zoning unconstitutional as applied to 
an undeveloped parcel where asserted objective of mixed uses/reduction of traffic congestion 
were inapplicable to an area that already demonstrated mixed use); W.O. Brisben v. City of 
Montgomery, 637 N.E.2d 347 (Ohio Ct. 1994) (invalidating a residential zoning classification 
that rendered the development of a property economically infeasible); Zeltig Land Dev. Corp. 
v. Bainbridge Twp., 599 N.E.2d 383 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (invalidating 5-acre minimum lot 
size after finding that lot size made public sewer uneconomic, and property’s location on 
shallow bedrock precluded septic tanks). 
181Kozenick, 131 A.2d 16. 
182Pennsylvania has established a procedure in which a landowner may couple a challenge 
to an ordinance with a request for a so-called “curative amendment.”  53 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. §10609.01 (West 1997). 
183PHILIP GREEN, A ZONING PRIMER FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATORS 8 (1978) 
184Id. 
185See, e.g., D. GODSCHALK, F. PARKER & T. KNOCHE, CARRYING CAPACITY:  A BASIS FOR 
COASTAL PLANNING?  (1974). 
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distinguish zones; to the extent that the mapper must engage in guesswork, the 
technical studies have failed in one of their major purposes. 
3.  Boundaries of Zones Must be Sufficiently Precise 
The Procedural Due Process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be 
heard have been discussed above.  At the mapping stage of the planning process, 
these requirements tell the planning staff to describe or draw the boundaries of zones 
so as to give landowners adequate notice of the restrictions placed on their 
properties.186 
The mapper must, therefore, navigate a narrow course between the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses.  Classifications establishing separate zones 
must be rational; yet, the boundary lines separating these zones must be reasonably 
precise.  The balancing of these factors is particularly problematic in the zoning of 
critical environmental areas (which by their nature are usually difficult to define).187 
Nevertheless, the Due Process Clause is not so strict as to require surveyed 
boundaries. Word definitions and delineations on aerial photographs and tax maps 
are an acceptable and preferable means of establishing boundaries of environmental 
zones.188 
4.  The Takings Issue 
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that “nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”189  While the so-called 
“takings clause” operates most directly as a check on a community’s exercise of its 
eminent domain power, its more indirect impact as a limit on the scope of police 
                                                                
186Vill. of Westlake v. Elrick, 83 N.E.2d 646 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948) (invalidating a zoning 
ordinance that failed to define with certainty the location, boundaries and areas of districts); 
Tirpack v. Maro, 222 N.E.2d 830 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967) (invalidating zoning ordinance that 
defined boundaries of districts with reference to an unpublished map).  See also cases cited at 
supra notes 52; Annot., Validity of zoning regulations with respect to uncertainty and 
identification of boundary lines, 39 A.L.R. 2d 766 (1955); Thomas Schoenbaum & Kenneth 
Silliman, Coastal Planning: The Designation and Management of Areas of Critical 
Environmental Concern, 13 URB. LAW ANNUAL 15, 35 (1977). 
187Consider the following discussion regarding the definition of buffer boundaries for 
streams and creeks:   
There are two principal ways of defining the buffer boundary.  The boundary may be a 
fixed distance from the banks or high water point of the stream.  Or the boundary may 
float or be adjusted according to the character of the adjacent lands…. The main 
advantage of the fixed-point buffer is the ease with which it is administered.  It is 
relatively simple to determine whether a projected development will fall within the 
buffer or not.  The key weakness is found in the rigidity of fixed boundaries…. 
(which) may exclude consideration of… related sensitive areas.   
THUROW,  supra note 94, at 13. 
188Schoenbaum & Silliman, supra note 186, at 13. 
189U.S. CONST. amend. V.  This takings prohibition is applicable to the states under the 
14th amendment.  Chicago B&Q R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 235-241 (1897). 
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power regulations has probably received more attention from courts and 
commentators.190 
An informed planning staff will pay close attention to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
continuing expansion of the remedies available following a determination of a 
“regulatory taking.”  Of course, courts have always stated that just compensation 
must be paid when a taking occurs.191  The key question is when this obligation is 
triggered?  The traditional view held that (following a court’s declaration of a taking 
coupled with its invalidation of the offending regulation) the municipality would 
only have to pay for the right to restrict the landowner’s property in the future: 
interpreters assumed that the municipality still had the option of abandoning its 
public purpose without paying damages for prior impacts of the invalidated 
regulations.192 
By contrast, the more recent theory (usually advanced under the heading of 
“inverse condemnation”) requires the government to pay compensation for damages 
suffered prior to the court’s determination of a taking.193  This apparent strengthening 
of the remedy lends some additional urgency to the takings issue.  The relevant 
inquiry here is properly limited to a consideration of only those additional 
precautions, not previously discussed, that a community must take in its application 
of regulations to specific parcels. 
This question can be answered by first listing those elements which often compel 
courts to find a taking, and then considering only those elements not addressed under 
another constitutional test.  Generally, courts are inclined to find a taking of property 
when: (1) a use restriction is not reasonably necessary to effectuate a substantial 
public purpose;194 or (2) government has physically invaded the land;195 or (3) the 
regulations cause an excessive diminution in the value of a parcel.196 The first 
element is essentially covered under the Substantive Due Process test;197 
                                                                
190Recent articles include Melvin R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings 
Clause and Local Land Use Decisions, 59 MD. L. REV. 464 (2000); Hart, supra note 77; 
Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature:  Understanding Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Commission, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 (1993). 
191See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-19. 
192Fred P. French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381, 384-386 (N.Y. 
1976); Presbytery of  Seattle v. King County, 787 P.2d 907, 914-15 (Wash. 1990). 
193Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999); 
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992); First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318-22 (1987). 
194Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U. S. 104, 127 (1977); State ex rel. 
Shemo v. City of Mayfield Heights, 765 N.E.2d 345, 350 (Ohio 2002). 
195United States v. Causby,  328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946). 
196Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014-19; Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); 
State ex rel. Shemo, 765 N.E.2d at 345. 
197See text associated with supra note 42. At least one state court seems to use the 
substantive due process grounds for cases in which it chooses to simply invalidate regulations, 
while reserving the taking grounds for rare cases in which compensation seems appropriate.  
Presbytery, 787 P.2d at 14-15.  Cf. Fred P. French, supra note 192 (suggesting that a 
government’s exercise of its regulatory police powers can never effect a regulatory taking). 
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recommendations for satisfying this requirement are given in Section III (A) above.  
Accordingly, the discussion below will focus on the last two elements. 
a.  Avoiding governmental physical invasions of land–Damages to property 
values caused by physical interference by government are often held to be takings.  
Examples include cases involving direct flights over a claimant’s land198 and 
repeated flooding caused by a public water project.199 Related to these cases, and 
more significant for land use planners, are those instances in which government 
institutes restrictive regulatory measures on a land area as a prelude to public 
acquisition. Such governmental conduct, always closely scrutinized in the past, is 
even more suspect today.200 Consequently, the planning staff should clearly 
distinguish between lands to be regulated and lands to be purchased, and should not 
use regulation as a tool to facilitate later purchases. 
b.  Avoiding excessive diminution in land values–While only excessive 
diminution in land values caused by regulations amount to a taking, the court 
decisions do not offer a uniform definition of  “excessive.”201  Consequently, the 
protection against a takings challenge calls for considerable exercise of judgment and 
opinion.  During the mapping phase of regulatory action, the planner should first use 
her best judgment to identify those areas where regulations are likely to cause the 
most severe impact on land values.  Second, she should list practical permitted uses 
for these general areas.202 Third, she should incorporate the list into the legislative 
                                                                
198Causby, 328 U.S. at 256; Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). 
199United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 
(1933); United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947). 
200Cities apparently had used regulations as preludes to public acquisition in both San 
Diego Gas & Elec. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), and Agins v. City of  Tiburon, 
447 U.S. 255 (1980); however, in neither case did the U.S. Supreme Court’s disposition turn 
on these facts.  For a thorough listing of cases holding pre-condemnation downzonings to 
constitute “takings” violations, see Alan E. Brownstein, Illicit Legislative Motive In the 
Municipal Land Use Regulation Process, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 68-78 (1988).  On the more 
specific subject of “planner’s blight” (i.e., property owner’s allegation that property values 
have been “taken” due to inclusion of property in mapped urban renewal areas), cf. Sayre v. 
City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1974) (rejecting claim); Woodland Market Realty Co. 
v. City of Cleveland, 426 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1970) (rejecting claim); Cook v. Cleveland State 
Univ., 104 F. Supp. 2d 752 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (rejecting claim), with Henn v. City of Highland 
Heights, 69 F. Supp. 2d 908 (E.D. Ky. 1999) (finding inadequate basis for city’s designation 
of a blighted neighborhood), vacated, 248 F.3d 1148 (6th Cir. 2001) . 
201See supra note 191. 
202See Schoenbaum & Silliman, supra note 186, at 46.  See also Turnpike Realty v. Town 
of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891, 899-900 (Mass. 1972); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 
761, 765 (Wis. 1972).  In North Carolina, see Helms v. City of Charlotte, 122 S.E.2d 817 
(N.C. 1961) (remanding to determine whether city’s rezoning of a 5,000 square-foot lot from 
“industrial” to “residential” caused the lot to retain any practical value, given that new zoning 
required 7,500 square-foot minimum lot size).  In Ohio, cf. Shreiner v. Russell Township Bd. 
of Trustees, 573 N.E.2d 1230 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (striking down regulations rendering 
property “valueless”) with Columbia Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Montgomery, 564 N.E.2d 455 (Ohio 
1990) (upholding residential zoning where property left with value between $664,000 and 
$1,025,000) and Goldberg COS v. Council of City of Richmond Heights, 690 N.E.2d 510 
(Ohio 1998) (remanding to lower court to determine whether denial of variance to reduce 
required retail parking spaces from 554 spaces to 372 spaces was constitutional ). 
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findings prepared for the ordinance; the municipal attorney can then use the list in a 
future defense of the regulation. 
IV.  OFFICE GUIDELINES FOR “CURRENT PLANNING” 
The “current planning” division of the planning office is primarily concerned 
with the administration of a community’s land development laws.  The current 
planner’s task is to draw upon previously established policies and rules to render 
correct and consistent decisions on individual cases. 
These individual cases can be grouped into major categories.  Rezoning decisions 
constitute one important function.  Although requests for rezoning frequently issued 
from individual property owners concerned with the use of a single parcel, rezoning 
is necessarily a legislative or rulemaking function: one which lays down general 
policies without regard to the attributes of a specific piece of property.203 
Rezoning can be contrasted with a second major function of current planning: 
discretionary review of specific development proposals.  Since discretionary review 
procedures are adjudicatory in nature, these case proceedings must satisfy procedural 
due process requirements.204 
Site plan review is the third major function of current planning.  Prior to the 
1960’s, subdivision plats were the only development site plans reviewed by most 
planners.  However, the advent of floating zones, planned unit development, 
clustering, and other devices, has greatly expanded the types of development 
subjected to site plan review. 
The reader will detect a common thread running through the separate discussions 
of the three current planning functions: the contention that a considerable amount of 
discretion can, and should, be removed from the review process.205 This issue of 
discretion, and the related issue of time delays in review, are so significant to the 
land developer that planning reforms in these areas are likely to decrease the volume 
of litigation faced by a community. 
There are at least six steps a planning office can take to minimize delay and 
uncertainty in its review procedures: pre-application conferences, mandatory time 
                                                                
203Rezoning is regarded as a legislative function in North Carolina, Kerik v. Davidson 
County, 551 S.E.2d 186 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001); Brown v. Town of Davidson, 439 S.E.2d 206 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1994), and in Ohio, BP Am., Inc. v. Avon City Council, 753 N.E.2d 947, 949 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001); In re Rocky Point Plaza Corp, 621 N.E.2d 566, 569  (Ohio Ct. App. 
1993). 
204Adjudicatory proceedings (also known as “quasi-judicial” proceedings) have been 
explained as follows:   
Quasi-judicial proceedings have been likened to “contested cases” before 
administrative agencies acting under federal or state administrative procedure acts.  In 
contrast to legislative proceedings, quasi-judicial proceedings must afford procedural 
due process to the participants.   
SHNIDMAN, et al., supra note 61, at 98.  Most land use discretionary devices (e.g., variances, 
special use permits, site plan reviews) encompass individualized review involving specific 
parties and specific applications.  In these cases, the reviewing board is determining 
“adjudicative facts,” a term first used by Professor K. C. Davis in 1942.  See Davis, An 
Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-
16 (1942). 
205Accord 1 WILLIAMS, supra note 35, § 163.50-163.84. 
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frames for review, revised application forms, specification of vested rights in the 
ordinances, setting standards in advance, and fast-tracking minor permits.206  A 
detailed discussion of these methods lies outside the scope of this paper, and the 
procedures are amply detailed elsewhere.207 Nevertheless, these general reforms will 
facilitate the planner’s performance of each of the three current planning functions 
discussed below. 
A. Rezoning Cases (Rulemaking) 
Rezoning decisions can take a variety of forms and can be initiated by either 
individual property owners or the municipality.  The typical amendment proposed by 
an individual property owner is the single tract-rezoning request, usually sought to 
permit the applicant to use the property for a particular planned use.  By contrast, 
municipally-initiated rezonings are frequently based on more general community 
concerns: for example, comprehensive rezoning usually takes place after a land use 
plan is prepared or updated. 
Most courts apply the same legislative review standard to landowner and city-
initiated rezonings: in deciding either type of rezoning case, a municipality is usually 
cloaked with a presumption of legislative validity.208 Those decisions that were 
successfully overturned were done so under the catchphrase of “spot zoning,” which 
was usually defined as the use of a zoning amendment to single out a small parcel of 
land and permit the owner to use it in a manner inconsistent with other uses in the 
area.209 
Within the past quarter century, however, the single tract rezoning request 
initiated by an individual property owner has begun to receive special treatment by 
courts in some states, most notably Colorado, Kansas and Oregon.210 These courts 
believe that case-by-case decisions on individual land uses are more appropriately 
characterized as administrative (or quasi-judicial), rather than legislative decisions. 
This characterization institutes a stricter standard of review for these cases that may, 
                                                                
206See AMERICAN PLANNING ASS’N, supra note 23, at 8-9, 17-23, 44. 
207Id. 
208Edward Kancler, Litigating the Zoning Case in Ohio: Suggestions to Fill the Textbook 
Void, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 33, 58 (1975). 
209Consider the following explanation of spot zoning:   
“Spot zoning” is essentially an epithet, not a doctrine, and covers essentially the same 
issues as those involved in interpretation of the comprehensive plan requirement.  
Three tests have been suggested in the case law to determine the presence of spot 
zoning, but none of these hold up as criteria under serious analysis: (1) Whether the 
use permitted is very different from the prevailing use in the surrounding area; (2) 
Whether the area is small or large; (3) The intent behind the change—whether this is 
for the benefit of the community as a whole or merely as a favor to a specific 
individual or group.   
1 WILLIAMS, supra note 35, § 27.  For cases applying this “epithet,” see Blades v. City of 
Raleigh, 187 S.E.2d 35 (N.C. 1972); Zopfi v. City of Wilmington, 160 S.E.2d 325 (N.C. 
1968); Allred v. City of Raleigh, 173 S.E.2d 533 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970), revd. on other 
grounds, 178 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. 1971). 
210Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 542 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1975); Golden v. City of  Overland 
Park, 584 P.2d 130 (Kan. 1978); Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm’r, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973). 
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as in Oregon, range all the way to requiring hearings with such trial-type features as 
the opportunity to present and rebut evidence, cross- examination, and a record with 
adequate findings.211 
Considering this divergence of views among courts as to the appropriate standard 
of review for rezoning decisions, the procedures recommended here represent a 
compromise between practices acceptable under the traditional approach to 
rezonings and those required under the recent searching inquiries conducted on 
single-tract zoning decisions. Consequently, the reader is advised that these 
recommended practices would probably be insufficient in at least Colorado, Kansas 
and Oregon. 
1.  Guiding Principles 
Given that the methods set forth in this section reflect a compromise, I will start 
by listing the major principles dictating the establishment of these procedures.  First, 
this model regards all rezoning decisions as rulemaking functions;212 it makes no 
distinction between so-called “comprehensive rezoning” and single parcel zone 
changes.  Second, planning staff should base all future zoning amendments upon the 
application of officially adopted policies to the particular request: the staff should 
phrase its rationale for the decision in terms of these policies.  Third, particular 
characteristics of the individual landowner or her parcel of land are irrelevant (except 
insofar as they clearly relate to existing policies). 
2.  Office Procedures on Zoning Applications 
a.  Accepting the application–The rezoning application should perform a dual 
function: in addition to supplying the planning staff with the information it needs to 
consider the application, it should also educate as to the proper factors upon which 
staff will base its final decision.  The application form should encourage the 
applicant to give some attention to these matters by including policy-related 
questions (i.e., how is the request consistent with land use policies?  How was the 
original zoning inconsistent?  How would the change impact the neighborhood?). 
b.  Notification of meeting–State enabling legislation will usually establish 
notification requirements for rezoning meetings.  A typical provision might require 
publication in a newspaper of general circulation two weeks in advance of the 
                                                                
211Fasano, 507 P.2d at 30. 
212In this writer’s view, the courts and commentators who classify rezoning decisions as 
adjudicatory in nature are less concerned with the need to afford participants trial-type features 
(e.g., cross-examination, sworn testimony) than they are with replacing a lenient standard of 
substantive review with a closer analysis of the relevant planning background.  See, e.g., 
Golden, 584 P.2d at 135-37 (reaffirming that the standard of review is “reasonableness,” but 
requiring the governing body to include minutes summarizing the factors it considered in 
making its decision); Brough, supra note 25, at 944-45; see also Note, Developments in the 
Law-Zoning, supra note 54, at 1546-47.  Accordingly, this article’s recommended rezoning 
procedures are designed to withstand an intense standard of substantive review: rezoning 
decisions must explicitly reference applicable land use policies and must be based on a sound 
application of these policies.  However, this article’s model does not endorse the quasi-judicial 
procedures (sworn testimony, cross examination) required by the courts in Colorado, Kansas 
and Oregon. 
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meeting date.  Additionally, staff should mail individual notices to the applicant and 
to all immediately adjacent landowners. 
c.  Staff decision on the request—Staff should analyze the request in terms of its 
consistency with the policies enumerated in the adopted five-year policies plan.  The 
final staff decision should be reduced to writing.  The writing should contain a brief 
description of the request (but not a description of the applicant’s proposed use of the 
property.)  The writing should also cite relevant policies and their applicability to the 
particular request.  As noted earlier, staff should disregard as irrelevant any 
particular attributes of the applicant or her property (except insofar as they directly 
relate to the application of the policies.) 
Many planning staffs have customarily mailed copies of their recommendations 
to planning boards or governing bodies in advance of the meeting date. When this 
practice is followed, the staff should also mail a copy to the applicant.  This decision 
should contain two disclaimers: (1) recommendations are subject to change if 
additional information is acquired prior to the meeting date; and (2) staff will not 
comment on recommendations prior to the meeting date. 
Although I do not recommend individual mailing of staff decisions to adjacent 
property owners, the original notification of the meeting date should advise these 
persons that copies of staff recommendations will be available a certain number of 
days in advance of the meeting date. 
d.  Conduct of the public meeting–The governing body and the planning board 
should each adopt and publish general ground rules for the hearing of rezoning 
requests.  A typical format would allocate time for the applicant’s proposal, staff 
recommendations, and public comment, with rough time limits set for each phase of 
the meetings. Sworn testimony, cross-examination, rebuttal and other rights 
commonly associated with a due process hearing are unnecessary and should not be 
provided.213 
e.  The decision–The decisions, which can and should be announced at the same 
meeting where the comments are received, should inform the applicant and the 
public of the policy reasons for the decision; however, particularly in those states 
where rezoning decisions still enjoy a healthy presumption of validity, the decision 
should also explicitly reference more general legislative powers.  A typical provision 
might read as follows: 
Following a public hearing held on (date), the municipality of (city) 
decided to (grant/deny) your rezoning request.  This decision was based 
on general considerations of public health, safety, and general welfare.  
Additionally, the following policies contained in (city’s) five-year policies 
plan support the decision: 
Staff should deliver a written copy of the decision to the applicant. 
3. Redefining the Role of the Planning Commission 
Planning commissions often decide on a wide variety of land development cases, 
including rezonings, special use permits, and subdivision and other site plan reviews.  
The quality of the Commission’s decisions on rezoning cases can be improved by 
removing the other matters from planning commission review. 
                                                                
213See supra note 212, and accompanying text. 
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The redefined planning commission would thus, concentrate on long-range 
planning recommendations (with its attendant zoning policy decisions), rather than 
the adjudication of particular development proposals.  Hearing officials can more 
properly and fairly perform the latter function. 
By concentrating the planning commission’s efforts on continuous planning as 
embodied in the adoption and revision of the policies plan, rezoning decisions are 
more likely to be infused with an appreciation of policy determinants rather than the 
particular needs of the individual applicant. 
B.  Site Plan Review 
The history of site plan review by planners closely tracks the general 
developments in the planning field discussed in Section I (A) above.  That is, an 
original scheme for examining a narrow range of developments with reference to 
preset standards has been expanded to encompass a case-by-case review of a broad 
range of development proposals. 
Governmental site plan review can first be seen in the land platting legislation 
enacted in the late 19th century.  Concern about surveying inaccuracies and 
discrepancies was the motivating force behind these acts, which required developers 
wishing to record maps or plats to meet certain surveying requirements.214  By the 
1920s, a plethora of poorly designed new subdivisions served by inadequate facilities 
spurred the adoption of subdivision control provisions within the Standard City 
Planning Enabling Act.215 
Prior to the 1950s, most courts strictly limited the approving body to the 
standards or conditions specified in the enabling legislation.216 Subdivision 
regulations at that time typically consisted of objective standards based on enabling 
legislation; once the applicant had complied with these stated conditions, the 
approval of the plat by the governing body was regarded as a ministerial duty.217 
Beginning with a 1949 California decision, in which a court upheld the Los 
Angeles City Council’s imposition of conditions of approval not expressly provided 
for in the state legislation or the local ordinance,218 the review of subdivision plats 
has gradually evolved into a process characterized as “[requiring] a high degree of 
. . . discretion.”219 Discretionary standards have been built into many ordinances; 
                                                                
214MANDELKAR & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 95, at 783. 
215U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT  §§ 13-14 
(1928). 
216State ex. rel. Jackson and Morris, Inc. v. Smuczynski, 102 N.E.2d 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1951); State ex. rel Strother v. Chase, 42 Mo. App. 343 (Mo. Ct. App. 1890).  In Ohio, cf. 
State ex. rel. Pelham Dev. Corp. v. Cerny, 228 N.E.2d 309 (Ohio 1967) (finding that a 
mandamus remedy will issue to compel action on subdivision plat within 30 days as required 
by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 711.09) with State ex. rel. Square v. Planning Comm’n, 413 
N.E.2d 825 (Ohio 1980) (finding that a mandamus remedy will not issue to compel action on 
subdivision plat within 30 days, since developer had a plain and adequate remedy in the form 
of a declaratory judgment action . 
217Id. 
218Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 207 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1949). 
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these standards encourage the developer to negotiate a site plan with the planning 
staff.  Further, they allow for greater control by the staff over subdivision design.220 
Moreover, site plan review is now used in a considerably wider range of 
development types.  Site plan requirements are often included in zoning ordinance 
provisions authorizing special use permits, floating zone amendments, townhouse 
and condominium projects, and planned unit developments.221 In summarizing site 
plan review, Professor Norman Williams stated: 
Many modern zoning ordinances contain provisions for site plan review, 
and this is among the most useful techniques in modern zoning.  In many 
communities, especially large built-up ones, most new development takes 
place by the assembly of several lots and their redevelopment by private 
investment, usually without public assistance.  In regulating such 
redevelopment, site plan review performs a function analogous to 
subdivision control (on vacant land) and urban renewal (for worn out 
areas).  Like most administrative arrangements, such processes may be 
misconceived or misused, to deal with matters far beyond their 
appropriate function.  Properly conceived, such regulations are concerned 
primarily with (a) the layout of buildings and other spaces, including 
parking areas, and (b) the provision for access to and from the public 
street system..222  
The public review of site plans for a wider range of projects is a welcome 
development.  Among the benefits are improved design of individual projects, better 
coordination of projects with each other, and careful analyses of necessary 
improvements.  More serious questions can be raised concerning the increased 
discretion granted to planning staffs and governing bodies in their review of these 
site plans.  This section will address two questions related to this issue; the answers 
will in turn suggest appropriate office procedures for the current planning division in 
its review of site plans. 
                                                          
219C & D P’ship v. Gahanna, 474 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ohio 1984); Emerald Lakes, Inc. v. 
South Russell Planning Comm., 598 N.E.2d  60, 62 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).  In North Carolina, 
see River Birch Assoc. v. City of Raleigh, 388 S.E.2d 538 (N.C. 1990), in which the North 
Carolina Supreme Court upheld the City of Raleigh’s requirement for dedication to a 
homeowners association of three acres open space within a 19.6 acre town home project. 
220See, e.g., River Birch, 388 S.E.2d at 546-51 (holding that city can reject a “final plat” 
based on its noncompliance with a “preliminary plan:” this decision contains a thorough 
explanation of the differences among the terms “sketch plan,” “preliminary plan,” and “final 
plat” as the terms are used in subdivision control); Emerald Lake, 598 N.E.2d at 62 (holding 
village had authority to enact a provision—requiring developer to supply evidence of water 
availability for each lot when a governmental water supply is not available—not specifically 
mentioned or authorized by enabling statute; also holding village had authority to reject 
developer’s plat due to nonconformance with such provision). 
221Site plan review authority in Ohio was approved in Lakewood Homes, Inc. v. Bd. of 
Adjustment, 258 N.E.2d 470 (Ohio Misc. 1970) modified, 267 N.E.2d 595 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1971). 
2221 WILLIAMS, supra note 35, § 152.01 (emphasis added). 
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1.  Should Discretion be Removed from Site Plan Review? 
Although discretionary site plan review affords a number of advantages to a 
planning staff, probably none is more frequently extolled than design review.  The 
case-by-case analysis of a developer’s site plans is a procedure tailor-made for the 
department gifted with well-trained design professionals.  Design modifications that 
could not be required under a ministerial review procedure can be easily exacted 
when each case is treated separately.  In fact, this individual review of projects is 
compatible with recent trends in environmental design, which regard the 
development of each tract as a unique problem of adjusting the proposed use to the 
environmental constraints of the site. 
Further, unlike the use of discretion in other areas discussed infra,223 the use of 
discretionary site plan review standards does not appear to lead to an increase in land 
use litigation. The opportunities for compromise, the relatively minimal costs of 
most imposed conditions, and the quasi-judicial protections mandated by the courts, 
all combine to make developers grudgingly accept conditions or requirements of 
doubtful validity.  Finally, many states regard subdivision review, the most widely-
used form of site plan review, as adjudicatory in nature; this insures a full range of 
procedural protections.224 
There are some arguments against discretionary site plan review.   Although the 
method may work well in communities which have able design professionals to 
conduct the review, this situation is the exception rather than the rule.  Many 
communities lack the resources to employ full-time design professionals; those 
communities that do have trained staff sometimes experience that staff modifying 
projects to meet their personal tastes. 
Additionally, the results of case-by-case reviews of site plans are difficult to 
predict and frequently involve longer and more uncertain time periods for approval.  
The significant impact of these latter factors on housing costs calls for an 
examination of more predictable alternatives to discretionary site plan review. 
2.  Are There Sufficient Guidelines to Establish Advance Conditions? 
One of the major advantages of individual site plan review is the opportunity it 
affords staffs to respond to unique development problems.  Consequently, many 
planners would warn that the replacement of this review with uniform advance 
standards would handcuff the staff when unique problems arise. 
Experience in the review of site plans is the best safeguard against this problem.  
Thus, it comes as no surprise that those departments with considerable experience in 
site plan review are confidently incorporating their heritages of design and planning 
principles into advance guidelines.225 
                                                                
223See infra note 228, and accompanying text. 
224The review of subdivision plats is classified as adjudicatory (quasi-judicial) in both 
North Carolina, see Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 387 S.E.2d 635 (N.C. 1990), cert. denied, 
496 U.S. 931 (1990); Springdale Estates Assoc. v. Wake County, 267 S. E. 2d 415 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1980), and in Ohio, see C & D P’ship, 474 N.E.2d 303; Emerald Lakes, 598 N.E2d at 62. 
225The American Planning Association described Sacramento County’s approach: 
Sacramento County, California has been successful in setting guidelines for PUD 
projects in advance of concrete proposals rather than in conjunction with them.  
Instead of drafting a single PUD ordinance that applies to any potential PUD in the 
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Moreover, Lane Kendig’s performance zoning textbook culminated his 
exhaustive efforts to shift the practice of zoning from an ad-hoc administrative 
process to a legislative act: Kendig argued that his performance standards were 
designed to anticipate and correct nearly all problems raised by the development of a 
particular site.226 
On balance, planning staffs that lack design professionals should practice site 
plan review as the ministerial process it once was.227 Only sophisticated planning 
staffs should perform extensive discretionary site plan review, and even those staffs 
should gradually attempt to convert some of their practices into advance standards. 
C. Discretionary Review Procedures 
I have previously argued that adjudicatory land use decision-making (with its 
attendant due process hearing requirements) should be limited to the narrowest 
possible range of planning activities.  Specifically, the planning staff should confine 
discretionary, case-by-case reviews to four types of decisions: (1) traditional special 
use permits; (2) variances; (3) predefined environmental critical areas; and (4) 
discretionary site plan review by select professionals (see Section IV (B)). 
I have already discussed one benefit of more limited discretionary review: that is 
the gain in predictability, leading, in turn, to lower land development cost impacts.  
However, the removal of some categories of decisions from “special use” review can 
also minimize future litigation against a community.  Whenever a community 
changes a permitted use to a special use, or classifies a new use (e.g., townhouses 
and condominiums) as special, it often removes a significant protective cover from 
its future decisions–the presumption that legislative actions are valid.228 
                                                          
jurisdiction, the county has written a set of individually tailored performance standards 
that govern specific undeveloped parcels in the county.  In this way, criteria can be 
less vague; the applicant knows ahead of time any particular requirements that are 
attached to a parcel.   
American Planning Association, supra note 23, at 44. 
226See generally KENDIG, supra note 34, at 281-88. 
227Accord Jack L. Nasar & Peg Grannis, Design Review Reviewed: Administrative versus 
Discretionary Methods, 65 J. AMER. INST. PLANNERS 424 (1999) (asserting that, based on a 
study of projects in a Columbus neighorhood, discretionary design review is not demonstrably 
better than  measurable standards).   In ruling that a planning board acting in its design review 
capacity exceeded its authority by prohibiting an otherwise permitted use (a convenience 
market), a New Jersey court stated:   
the role of the planning board, with respect to permitted or in commercial or industrial 
uses, is the grant or denial of site plan approval….Although site plan review affords a 
planning board wide discretion to insure compliance with the objectives and 
requirements of the site plan ordinance…. it was never intended to include the 
legislative or quasi-judicial power to prohibit a permitted use…  
PRB Enter., Inc. v. S. Brunswick Planning Bd., 518 A.2d 1099 (N.J. 1987) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added).  For New York decisions strictly construing site plan review, see Apache 
Assocs. v. Planning Bd., 517 N.Y.S.2d 29 (N.Y. 1987); Moriarty v. Planning Bd., 506 
N.Y.S.2d 184 (N.Y. 1986), all cited in 1 WILLIAMS, supra note 35, § 152.01. 
228This point is expressed in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994):   
in evaluating most generally applicable zoning regulations, the burden properly rests 
on the party challenging the regulation to prove that it constitutes an arbitrary 
regulation of property rights.  See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 
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Consider the common request for a planning staff to address a new or 
controversial use of land. Instead of intensively researching the problem and 
adopting appropriate standards for such uses, many departments postpone these 
decisions by simply classifying the use as “special.”  This delaying tactic frequently 
backfires when a specific use is adjudicated.  At the very time the governing body is 
hurriedly deciding and documenting its case, the quasi-judicial nature of the 
proceedings is generating considerable publicity (and controversy).  Once the 
decision is made, municipal opponents can confidently enter the courts knowing that 
both the administrative procedures and the substantive decision will be closely 
scrutinized. 
1. Appropriate Categories For Adjudicatory Procedures 
a.  Traditional special use permits–As originally conceived, the special use 
permit was designed primarily to permit certain admittedly desirable but potentially 
problematic uses to locate within a zone, provided that certain conditions were set. 
The “traditional” types of special uses were described by New Jersey Supreme Court 
Justice Hall:  “the uses so treated are generally those serving considerable numbers 
of people, such as private schools, clubs, hospitals and even churches as 
distinguished from governmental structure or activities on the one hand . . . or 
businesses on the other.”229 
A fairly narrow definition of special uses should be maintained; the community 
should resist the urge to use the special use category as a dumping ground for 
postponed decisions on new and controversial uses.230 
b.  Variances–Statutory criteria for the grant of zoning variances are 
fundamentally adjudicatory in nature: they focus on the attributes of a special parcel.  
Although local governments will often craft the specific standards for the granting of 
variances, the courts will usually require that variance hearings include sworn 
testimony, cross examination and other procedural protections.231 
                                                          
U.S. 365 (1926).  Here, by contrast, the city made an adjudicative decision to 
condition petitioner’s application for a building permit on an individual parcel.  In this 
situation, the burden properly rests on the city. . . .   
Id. at 391 n.8 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  Accord SCHNIDMAN, et al., supra note 61, 
§ 3.1.2(b). 
229Tullo v. Township of Millburn, 149 A.2d 620, 625 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959). 
230People v. Perez,  29 Cal. Rptr. 781, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).  For a lengthy explanation 
of “special exceptions” in North Carolina, see Jackson v. Guilford County Bd. of Adjustment, 
163 S.E.2d 265 (N.C. Ct. App. 1968), affd, 166 S.E.2d 78 (N.C. 1969) (upholding zoning 
board of adjustment’s issuance of special exception against neighbors’ attack; confirming that 
procedure is quasi-judicial).  Special use permit hearings in Ohio are clearly quasi-judicial.  
Cf. Cmty. Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp., 613 N.E.2d 580 (Ohio 1993) (upholding 
the township’s review procedures) with Adelman Real Estate Co. v. Gabanic, 672 N.E.2d 
1087 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (finding procedures deficient).  See also State ex. rel. Synod of 
Ohio of United Lutheran Church in America v. Joseph, 39 N.E.2d 515 (Ohio 1942) (upholding 
hearing of such cases by the governing body itself); Blue Stone Sand & Gravel v. Montana Tp. 
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 127 Ohio App. 3d 27, 711 N.E.2d 749 (1998) (upholding city’s use of 
a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard). 
231See, e.g., Crist v. City of Jacksonville, 507 S.E.2d 899, 900 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); 
Willoughby Hills v. C.C. Bar’s Sahara, 591 N.E.2d 1203, 1208 (Ohio 1992). 
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c.  Development in critical environmental areas–Only within the last quarter of 
the 20th century has environmental planning been incorporated into the general land 
use planning process. Relying largely on the guidance of the ALI Model Land 
Development Code, most governments which have defined critical environmental 
areas (e.g., natural hazard areas, resource areas) have established a permitting system 
to control development. Given the unique natural attributes of these environmental 
areas, the retention of discretionary review procedures for development in such areas 
is warranted. 
2.  Guidelines for Administrative Review 
Given that administrative review is appropriate for a particular type of 
development, what specific procedures should be established?   First, before the 
hearing even commences, the hearing official(s) must be careful to avoid any contact 
with the parties or their attorneys.  In some states, formal ethical rules may prohibit 
such contacts.232  Even in states with no formal prohibitions, the hearing official still 
must function as an impartial arbiter.233  Pre-hearing conversations with one or more 
parties can severely compromise this status.  With respect to the hearing itself, the 
“Administrative Hearings” section of the ALI Model Land Development Code offers 
a useful list of procedures.234 
a.  Notice and publication–The Code requires: (1) notice of a hearing at least two 
weeks in advance of the hearing date; (2) publication in a newspaper of general 
circulation; and (3) individual notice to the developer and nearby landowners.235 
State enabling legislation may alter these requirements. 
b.  The hearing process–The governing body is authorized to designate a hearing 
official to conduct the hearing.236 All testimony at this hearing is under oath.237  The 
hearing official(s) must allow the parties to present evidence, make arguments, and 
examine and cross-examine witnesses (subject to reasonable limits on the number of 
witnesses and the nature and length of their testimony).238 Meaningful cross-
examination can only occur when the witnesses state facts rather than opinions or 
general public comment239  The governing body must make a full record of the 
hearing that shall be transcribed upon request.240  
                                                                
232See generally R. Lisle Baker, Ethical Limits on Attorney Contact with Represented and 
Unrepresented Officials: The Example of Municipal Zoning Boards Making Site-Specific Land 
Use Decisions, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 349 (1997). 
233See supra note 54. 
234MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 2-304 (1976). 
235Id. at § 2-304(2). 
236Id. at § 2-304(4). 
237Id. at § 2-304(6). 
238Id. at § 2-304(7). 
239In Alderman Real Estate Co. v. Gabanic, 672 N.E.2d 1087, 1090 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) 
(citations omitted), an Ohio appellate court reversed a trial court’s affirmance of a conditional 
use permit denial; in relevant part, the appellate court reiterated:   
A public hearing is one where members of the general public may speak and express 
their views on the question of governmental, political and policy considerations as to 
whether certain legislation should be adopted.  Adjudication hearings, however, are 
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c.  Written findings of fact and conclusions of law–The final decision should be in 
writing, based on the record, and include findings of fact and conclusions together 
with the reasons therefor.241 A conclusory board determination unsupported by 
factual findings will most likely be reversed and remanded by a reviewing court.242 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Despite their often conflicting interests, today’s real estate developers and urban 
planners share common frustrations: each group must practice its trade in a political 
maze that can yield wrong turns, dead ends, and fruitless journeys; and each group 
now faces the risk of significant monetary liability when it fails to correctly predict 
the timing and results of its trips through the maze. 
Conflicting messages sent by the courts and legislatures impede planners’ and 
politicians’ efforts to develop fair and predictable land use controls.  When these 
public officials respond with highly discretionary and—in many cases—arbitrary 
land use controls, developers in turn respond by either: (1) increasing prices to 
consumers (and thereby recovering the developer’s increased costs due to delay); or 
(2) withdrawing from the market altogether. 
This Article attempts to lessen the public officials’ uncertainties through the use 
of a model designed to anticipate the legal outcomes of future land use disputes.  In 
older Rustbelt cities that are attempting to attract developers, the public officials will 
concentrate their actions on incentives (e.g., marketing, low-interest loans, tax 
incentives) lying at the lower end of the “least restrictive alternative” analysis.  For 
those regulations that remain necessary, the principal challenge will be to simplify 
the process and reduce the time a developer or redeveloper spends in navigating the 
process. 
The strategy will be different for communities at the opposite end of the growth 
spectrum.  Consider a rural village threatened by overzealous developers.  The 
village may wish to repel most developers.  In doing so, the village will probably use 
strong regulatory actions (e.g., temporary moratoria, outright prohibitions) at the 
higher end of the “least restrictive alternative” analysis.  If the village focuses on its 
goals and police power objectives, then tailors its regulatory actions to the 
objectives, it will reduce its legal uncertainties while strengthening its defenses to the 
unwanted development. 
The different “languages” of lawyers and planners convey more differences–and 
more confusion–than exist in real life.  The two professions are actually trained to 
analyze land use issues in very similar fashion.  If planners rephrase their 
terminology to include lawyers’ police power objectives, they can reduce confusion 
and achieve a more surgical approach to land use regulation.  In the process, they can 
begin to meet the challenge issued twenty years ago by Justice Brennan in his San 
Diego dissent. 
                                                          
not subject to such public comment but, instead, involve the determination of rights of 
specific persons and whether such rights should be granted based upon evidence (not 
public opinion) presented at the hearing.   
Id. 
240MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 2-304 (10)-(12) (1976). 
241Id. at § 2-304 (12). 
242See supra note 54. 
55Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
